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In 2015, China procured a formal and statutory legal definition of terrorism for the first time. 
Where does the definition stand in comparison to prior Chinese state conceptions? How does the 
definition compare to other states internationally? The standard model of comparison between 
states lacks cohesion—academics war over the basic definition of terrorism (or simply invent one) 
to cover-up a gap in the literature of Terrorism Studies. The weakness is mirrored on a global scale, 
where no consensus-level definition of terrorism has been reached. Often, the focus is on 
actor/action senses of the phenomena, and not a legalistic definition. Despite the lack of consensus 
regarding terrorism, I will evaluate the general definitions in international organizations, 
conventions, regional agreements, and individual countries, and compare these to China’s 
definitions. Centers of socialization, chiefly supra-national organizations such as the United 
Nations, international organizations, treaties, etc. are often forums of exchange and deposit for 
accountability between States and defining terrorism—these organs are my data source. I do not 
evaluate, however, the outcomes of how states and organizations define terrorism, focusing 
exclusively on the definitions themselves. Through this analysis, I hope to reach several 
conclusions: 1) identify trends in definitional composition between and among States; 2) identify 
China’s own path of definitional evolution; 3) compare China’s evolution internationally to gain 
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Despite a well-documented history of domestic security laws that violate international 
conventions, international media erupted into a firestorm in late-2014 when it was revealed China 
had drafted a new counter-terrorism law. Predictably, various media outlets and human rights 
groups decried the draft as “dangerous” for a traditional set of reasons: Chinese expansionism, 
new room for human rights violations, and a dangerous vagueness.1 However, how realistic are 
these claims? Did China simply rename its domestic attacks on Uyghurs after 9/11 to avoid human 
rights criticism? Was there anything revolutionary about the new law beyond a statutory provision 
defining terrorism? This paper deals directly with those questions by considering China’s history 
in defining terrorism. Contrary to earlier assessments, this paper concludes China’s Counter-
Terrorism Law is not only expected, but further aligned China with the international community, 
suggesting socialization with specific international norms. 
In Chinese law, the concept of terrorism, despite being a non-native political term, has 
roots as early as the 1979 Constitution, but began to gain formal legal footing in 1997, with an 
even-quicker development following 9/11. Terrorism is an exogenous expression and concept to 
China, historically characterized as “counter-revolutionary” crimes against the ruling elite, or 
earlier simply crimes against the emperor (Wong, 2008). Li Enshen (2016) sums-up the situation 
as:  
Given that terrorism was essentially unheard of in China prior to the 1980s, China did not 
incorporate terrorist crimes into its domestic legislation until 1997. Those who arrested for 
                                                     
1 Excellent examples can be found from the South China Morning Post < 
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1647945/pla-could-be-used-fight-terror-abroad>, 
Human Rights Watch <https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/01/20/china-draft-counterterrorism-law-





terrorist, separatist, and/or extremist acts were often charged with the crimes of "disrupting 
public order," "endangering state security," or other individual crime stipulated in the 1979 
Criminal Law (e.g., crimes of causing explosions or hijacking motor vehicles (2016, p. 
355). 
Following 9/11, the Chinese government followed the rest of the international community in 
ordering a penal structure against terrorism, with key amendments to the Criminal Code in 20012 
and 2011.3 Additionally, China acceded to major regional and international agreements, partnering 
to combat the threat of global terrorism,4 with attention drawn to the need to combat terrorism 
                                                     
2 Amendment (III) of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China (中华人民共和国刑法
修正案(三)) (2001). Article 120 (I) is added to the Criminal Law, outlining penalties for those 
funding “a terrorist organization” or anyone who “commits terrorist activities” (资助恐怖活动组
织或者实施恐怖活动的个人的). 
3 Amendment (VIII) to the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China (中华人民共和国刑
法修正案(八)) (2011). Article 66 is amended to punish “recidivism” of terrorists, those violating 
national security, and gang members (危害国家安全犯罪、恐怖活动犯罪、黑社会性质的组
织犯罪的犯罪分子，在刑罚执行完毕或者赦免以后，在任何时候再犯上述任一类罪的，都
以累犯论处). 
4 In total, China has acceded to over a dozen broad-spectrum, open-membership treaties and 
conventions. These Include: These Conventions include: 1970 Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hague Convention), 1971 Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Sabotage Convention or Montreal 
Convention), 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against 
Internationally Protected Persons (Diplomatic Agents Convention), 1979 International Convention 
against the Taking of Hostages (Hostages Convention), 1980 Convention on the Physical 
Protection of Nuclear Material (Nuclear Materials Convention), 1988 Protocol for the Suppression 
of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation (Airport Protocol), 
1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 
(Maritime Convention), 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety 
of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (Fixed Platform Protocol), 1991 Convention 
on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection (Plastic Explosives Convention), 
1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (Terrorist Bombing 
Convention), 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 
(Terrorist Financing Convention), 2005 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of 
Nuclear Terrorism (Nuclear Terrorism Convention), 2010 Convention on the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation (Beijing Convention), and 2010 Protocol 
Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Beijing 
Protocol). See: The United Nations Treaty Collection Website for a comprehensive list of 
accessions, signatures, and dates. https://treaties.un.org/ 
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before and after a formal adoption of a definition of terrorism into the Criminal Code.5 The 
recurrent theme throughout this paper will be: China has continued to socialize by adopting broad-
spectrum changes to criminal law and state policy, eventually leading to 2015 (effective 2016) 
when China adopted standing international norms of defining terrorism into statutory law. 
In 2015, China procured a formal and statutory legal definition of terrorism for the first 
time: 
For the purpose of this Law, “terrorism” means any proposition or activity that, by means 
of violence, sabotage or threat, generates social panic, undermines public security, 
infringes upon personal and property rights, or menaces state authorities and international 
organizations, with the aim to realize political, ideological and other purposes.6 
 
Where does the definition stand in comparison to prior Chinese state conceptions? How does the 
definition compare to other states internationally? The standard model of comparison between 
states lacks cohesion—academics war over the basic definition of terrorism (or simply invent one) 
to cover-up a gap in the literature of Terrorism Studies. The weakness is mirrored on a global scale, 
where no consensus-level definition of terrorism has been reached. Often, the focus is on 
actor/action senses of the phenomena, and not a legalistic definition. Despite the lack of consensus 
regarding terrorism, I will evaluate the general definitions in international organizations, 
conventions, regional agreements, and individual countries through coding for ten frequently-
occurring standards. The goal through the coding is to repeat the process with respect  to China’s 
definitions, and identify potential convergence. Centers of socialization, chiefly supra-national 
organizations such as the United Nations, international organizations, treaties, etc. are often forums 
                                                     
5 Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Issues concerning 
Strengthening Anti-Terrorism Work (全国人大常委会关于加强反恐怖工作有关问题的决定) 
(2011). Defined terrorism prior to 015/2016, but it was not formally part of the Criminal Code. 




of exchange and deposit for accountability between States and defining terrorism—these organs 
are my data source. Through this analysis, I hope to reach several conclusions: 1) identify trends 
in definitional composition between and among States; 2) identify China’s own path of definitional 
evolution; 3) compare China’s evolution internationally to gain insight into either China’s 
definitional socialization or resilience to potential international norms. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
INTRODUCING TERRORISM STUDIES: A PROBLEM WITH DEFINING TERRORISM 
 
 Terrorism Studies, or the wholesale study of the phenomenon of terrorism, is a relatively 
new field. With most of the research in the body of literature authored post-9/11, many structural 
weaknesses have yet to be worked-out. The greatest being the lack of consensus with defining 
terrorism. Despite having a rich study of actors, actions, and consensus, scholarly infighting has 
paralyzed the field on old data. Newer, increasingly practical data sources such as law are a better 
fit to the study, given terrorism’s native home being in the legal sphere. I propose creating a new 
methodology for comparing state definitions of terrorism by consensus. To accomplish this, I 
combine the academic consensus approach with the legal discourse’s data of law to generate 
standards of comparison, rather than complete definitions. 
 Terrorism Studies, as a field, has yet to agree upon a cohesive definition of terrorism. The 
practical result of a diversified field of international legal definitions is that one country may claim 
anti-terrorist security measures are justified under a broad definition of terrorism, leading to human 
rights violations. Scholarly considerations, while less intense, carry long-standing research 
concerns that skew and limit the field toward narrow theses, often highlighting the constant 
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contestation over definitions of terrorism (Silke & Schmidt-Petersen, 2015).7  On one side of the 
spectrum, Terrorism Studies represents a field plagued with practical research constraints, unable 
to grapple with state secrets and interstate disagreement (e.g. Young & Findley, 2011; Freilich, 
Chermak, & Gruenewald, 2014). Conversely, Terrorism Studies’ recent (13 years) empirical 
strength, collaboration, and new data show promise to less-skeptical parties (Silke & Schmidt-
Petersen, 2015). Exemplifying the issue is the debate over whether to debate weakness within the 
field and how to debate the debate over weakness (Bell, Schlesinger, & Laqueur as cited in Schmid, 
2004).8 However, general weakness in and of itself is an empty concern—the impact of weakness 
is what should be worrisome. The most pronounced weakness and side-effect of a lack of cohesion 
within the field of Terrorism Studies remains an inability to amicably define terrorism. 
Defining terrorism in both law and policy serves as a point of focus, both in terms of a 
country’s prosecutorial methodology for punishing terrorist acts as well as building a strategy to 
pre-empt and combat terrorists. However, a country’s definition of terrorism matters differently to 
different audiences—when asking a regular person on the street, one might an answer relating to 
                                                     
7 Some of the key works attempting to answer this “health” assessment  are: Alex Schmid and 
Albert Jongman, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Databases, 
Theories and Literature (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Company, 1988); Clark 
McCauley (ed.), Terrorism Research and Public Policy (London: Frank Cass, 1991); Edna Reid, 
‘‘Evolution of a Body of Knowledge: An Analysis of Terrorism Research,’’ Information 
Processing & Management 33, no. 1 (1997): 91–106; Andrew Silke (ed.), Research on Terrorism: 
Trends, Achievements and Failures (London: Routledge, 2004); Monica Czwarno, ‘‘Misjudging 
Islamic Terrorism: The Academic Community’s Failure to Predict 9/11,’’ Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism 29, no. 7 (2006): 657–678; Magnus Ranstorp (ed.), Mapping Terrorism Research 
(London: Routledge, 2007); Richard Jackson, Marie B. Smyth, and Jeroen Gunning (eds.), Critical 
Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda (London: Routledge, 2009); and, Alex Schmid (ed.), 
The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research (London: Routledge, 2011). Andrew Silke & 
Jinnifer Schmidt-Peterson’s work, The Golden Age? What the 100 Most Cited Articles in 
Terrorism Studies Tell us, provided this list (2015, p. 10). 
8 Weinberg, Pedahzur, & Hirsch-Hoefler (2004) also list reasons explaining the disunity, choosing 
to focus upon methodological issues. They isolate: moral relativism, conceptual overlap, and 
conceptual stretching (2004). 
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“civilian deaths” or “explosions,” while asking a lawyer may illicit a recitation of statutory law, 
leading to a discussion of munitions, methods, and motive. The narrative remains consistent across 
the globe: everyone, from academics to regular folk with access to an outlet to express an opinion, 
owns a definition of what constitutes a “terrorist” (Schmid & Jongman, 1988; Sánchez-Cuenca & 
de la Calle, 2009; Schmid, 2004, p. 378).9  Explaining the differences in answers are the four 
discourses terrorism can be defined and discussed: academic, legal, public, and the terrorist actor 
(Schmid, 1992). The academic discourse is the approach most familiar to research, often seeking 
understanding in how a terrorist has been defined and how terrorists should be defined in the future. 
However, the approach isn’t uniform and contains several prominent strains dealing with defining 
terrorism. 
Generally speaking, the three approaches to defining terrorism in academia are: the action-
sense approach, the actor-sense approach, and mapping consensus among researchers. 10  On the 
state level, definitions take a similar approach, but are often couched through defining either 
specific acts constituting terrorist crimes, or associations with groups. The first two academic 
approaches, in many respects, are the two main “veins,” while the consensus mapping approach 
tries to make interdisciplinary sense. Action-sense approaches seek to understand the standards 
constituting terrorism instead of trying to identify terrorists with special focus paid to 
understanding the targets and audience of an attack, and the attack’s behavioral underpinnings 
                                                     
9 Google hits on definition of terrorism"  
October 4, 2004   January 27, 2005 
1. "definition of terrorism"  6,070 hits   2,310,000 hits 
2. "definitions of terrorism"  230,000 hits   856,000 hits   
3. "definitions terrorism"  232,000 hits   867,000 hits 
4. "definition of terrorism"  2,040,000 hits   82,400 hits  
5. "terrorism definition"  2,050,000 hits   2,250 hits 
6. "terrorism"   9,580,000 hits   21,200,000 hits 
10Beck and Miner defined this separation (2013, p. 837). 
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(Lizardo, 2008, p. 92; Sánchez-Cuenca & de la Calle, 2009, p. 33; Bergesen, 2007; Goodwin, 2006; 
Tilly, 2004).  The academic goals of the actor-sense approach are to understand both the underlying 
factors causing terrorism’s emergence (such as environment and political factors) as well as 
designate “who” a terrorist is en lieu of what terrorists do—typically requiring a focus on groups 
(Gibbs, 1989; Lizardo, 2008; Sánchez-Cuenca & de la Calle, 2009). However, both the actor and 
action-sense approaches feed a narrative of searching for a definition instead of settling upon one, 
always searching for new modes and modules to plug-in to a newer and more-academically 
palatable definition. Consensus mapping remedies part of the problem by presenting a definition 
de lege lata, despite continued data recycling. 
 Academic consensus approaches, while exhibiting strength through embracing a wide-
variety of perspectives, have suffered from data incest, inviting criticism for either over-
simplification or under-utilization of key aspects of terrorism’s definition. The problem lies in the 
data examined thus far—examining only other academic definitions, without including extra-
academic data. Alex Schmid & Albert J. Jongman’s seminal 1988 work, Political Terrorism: 
Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases Theories, and Literature, set the bar for most work 
attempting to consolidate numerous academic definitions of terrorism (Blackbourn, Davis & 
Taylor, 2013, p. 242). The work defines terrorism as:  
Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) 
clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, 
whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the main 
targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets 
of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, 
and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes 
between terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to 
manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of 
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demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or 
propaganda is primarily sought.11 
 
The widely-cited definition12 is often criticized either for severe vagueness or for exhibiting a 
piecemealed, standardized approach (Weinberg, Pedahzur, & Hirsch-Hoefler, 2004). An answer 
to the incestuous over-application and reapplication of the same academic data is to start looking 
elsewhere: at law and policy. Through seeking a consensus-based definition of terrorism based-
upon law instead of academic definitions, this paper contributes toward changing the conversation 
regarding academia’s data sourcing, without seeking a definition so much as a point of comparison 
though standards. 
The nativity of terrorism to legal discourse makes law a far-better source of data in 
understanding how terrorism is defined as opposed to how an academic may or may not view the 
term. Legal or “state” discourses—typically divided into common, criminal, administrative 
(policy), and civil law, both nationally and internationally—are the modes states, lawyers, and 
other legal organs take in defining terrorism. Academics have begun to slowly introduce legal data 
into scholarly consensus methods, but focus narrowly on small-scale country comparison studies 
and not global definitional consensus (e.g. Schmid, 2004; Blackbourn, Davis, & Taylor, 2013). 
These introductions accelerated along with the rest of the field of Terrorism Studies, when 
academics sought to understand the range, scope, and approaches of the treatment and prosecution 
of terrorists (Acharya, 2009; LaFree & Ackerman, 2009). Eventually, the ideal dataset would be 
to generate a “Global Counter-Terrorism Database,” but research has only entered the preliminary 
                                                     
11  Even this definition has been amended since its publication, with one of the more-recent 
iterations found here: http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/schmid-
terrorism-definition/html (Schmid, 2012) 
12 I encountered very few works that did not either cite this work or a later inception of the work 
from the same authors. 
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proposal stage (Shor, 2011). In order to construct an international narrative of terrorism’s legal 
development, this paper contributes to the literature identifying legal convergence in comparative 
country studies by adding China’s formal legal definition, comparing the definition internationally, 
and also giving a lens to view the definitions by—an international consensus method of looking at 
terrorism focused on law supplemented with policy.   
To have a stable basis of study, law must be the source of comparison because unlike China 
where legal reform is in a relative height, criminal law changes far-less frequently than state policy 
dealing with terrorism. Much of this instability is directly attributable to issues traditional issues 
of politics, such as: political figureheads changing, departments of government evolving, and 
public anxiety controlling both the evolution of and inception of policy. Often, rightist political 
parties act to strengthen terrorist policy regimes in the aftermath of elections following public 
anxiety following terror attacks (Huddy et al., 2005), straining stable policy examinations (Gibson, 
2006; Gibson, 2008; Hetherington & Suhay, 2011 in Peffley et al., 2015). Departments of 
government and political parties will take to labeling opposition as “terrorists” both formally and 
informally (Zeidan, 2006; Beck & Miner, 2013). With the typical features of departmental 
evolution, labeling, and oppositional anxiety extant, China is a unique case-study in the 
proliferation of research on policy because China (modern) was governed heavily by policy-driven 
“campaigns” prior to the 1990’s legal reforms, contains only one party capable of holding power, 
and has transformed into a law-based system. In China, unlike other states, a policy regime without 
stable legal code made defining terrorism unsurprisingly difficult. 
SCHOLARS AND DEFINING CHINA’S TERRORISM 
 
The literature surrounding China’s relationship with defining terrorism is meager—China 
is portrayed as a major international player, influential UN Security Council roadblock, and 
10 
 
potential future target of terrorism. However, very little literature exists examining China’s 
domestic definitions of terrorism and how the definitions developed independent of the 
international arena. Human rights-oriented research and scholars examining Terrorism Studies 
have called specific attention to China’s treatment of the country’s religious and ethnic minorities, 
chiefly the Uyghurs, using a critical lens to interrogate the application of policy. While useful to 
consider, the critical lens provides a context without a pre-textual understanding of “what” 
terrorism is in China prior to 2015. Domestic law must also be re-contextualized despite the limited 
literature available discussing terrorism—there is now a law on the books to be examined. 
 Contemporary literature on China’s terrorism policy in the context of ethno-religious 
repression studies, specifically concerning the treatment of Xinjiang and the Uyghur people, 
explores the policy implications of how religion (Islam) and Uyghur identity have been impacted 
by China’s counterterrorism policy. In Xinjiang, academics define terrorism within the context of 
broad-spectrum human rights abuses and discounting the scale of the issue, looking at the effects 
of law instead of the law itself. While nearly all state-identified terrorist activity in contemporary 
China has taken place in Xinjiang, scholarly consensus that is the normative and daily political 
activity of Uyghurs is done under strict repression, with wide-spread disapproval of the Central 
Chinese Government (Bovingdon, 2014, p. 40; Bovingdon, 2010; Tschantret, 2016). Through 
multiple “Strike Hard” (dafa) campaigns, and orchestrated state repression of ethnoreligious 
identity, the tumult occasionally spurs violence against governmental organs, but rarely targets 
civilians (Boehm, 2009, pp. 68-69; Roberts, 2012, p. 13). However, the lack-of transparency 
regarding terrorism of the Chinese state, coupled with a change in rhetoric regarding the risks and 
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associations of Uyghur “separatists” following 9/11 (Roberts, 2012; Pokalova, 2013),13 makes it 
difficult to determine what is and is not an actual act of terrorism. As pointed out earlier, China is 
a study of similar issues plaguing the field of Terrorism Studies—limited area access, unreliable 
media reporting, state secrets preventing access to prosecutions and detentions of terrorist suspects, 
and purported propaganda. While the determination and focus of specific acts of terrorism are 
difficult, by focusing on legal definitions of terrorism rather than applications, we measure 
consistent changes in documentable policy rather than a situational analysis which can be 
incomplete. 
Domestic legal examinations of Chinese anti-terrorism have failed to capture an effective 
and consistent definition of terrorism because of a focus on policy instead of law. An effective and 
consistent Chinese terrorism definition would be widely used among scholarship, reflect legal 
norms, and provide a base-line source of comparison. Instead, as is endemic and reflective of 
Terrorism Studies, definitions of domestic terrorism in China attempt to define terrorism within 
the ever-changing context of policy, such as: comparative punitiveness (Li, 2016),14  campaign-
style justice to rule of law transformation (ibid),15 and the confluence of regime transition and state 
capacity (Fu, 2012; Vicziany, 2003). Among the select studies examining legal development 
                                                     
13 According to Elena Pokalova (2013), the world had very-little knowledge of Xinjiang and 
Uyghur violence prior to 9/11, and China regarded the domestic conflict as a ‘separatist’ issue. 
She argues China orchestrated a global P.R. campaign, coinciding with the anti-jihadi/al-Qaeda 
(anti) movement, trying to identify Uyghur Islamic identity with the global jihadi movement—
with great success. For further discussion, see: Pokalova, E. (2013). Authoritarian Regimes 
against Terrorism: Lessons from China. Critical Studies on Terrorism, 6(2), 279–298. 
14 Punitiveness, or the severity of punishment, was found to be greater in the post-campaign justice 
era (where large military deployments and mass-line social projects ruled) than in the rule of law 
era (Li 2016, pp. 348-349). 
15“…during the 1980s and the most of the 1990s, the campaign-style justice against terrorism was 
in effect directed by Party policies rather than state laws. In many policy statements and official 
speeches, stringent state controls were prescribed as the principal means to address the concerns 
about Uyghur separatist activity and Islamic-based terrorism in Xinjiang” (Li 2016, p. 355). 
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looking exclusively at law (e.g. Boehm, 2009; Li, 2015; Fu, 2005; Li & Verhoeven, 2015), only 
one puts forth a concrete definition of terrorism (Li & Verhoeven, 2015, p. 909), despite 
overwhelming calls for reform (Boehm, 2009, pp. 117-118).16 Effectively ending debates over 
how China defines terrorism, the 2015 Counter-Terrorism law has opened-up a new gap in the 
literature: how did China get to 2015? This paper argues China’s relationship with the international 
community has so strongly influenced domestic policy, China’s international socialization has 
produced a very “global” definition of terrorism. International Socialization Theory is the 
mechanism through which this change occurred. 
AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIZATION 
 
The theoretical underpinnings of International Socialization Theory (IST) are not unlike 
the study of group and organizational socialization. If one pictures a country as a child entering a 
group/family of the international order, and gradually becoming accustomed to the norms of said 
family, you understand the basic tenants of IST.17 Treated largely as a metaphor, the most-concise 
and simple definition I rely upon is: “the process by which states internalize norms originating 
elsewhere in the international system” (Alderson, 2001, p. 417). The process is far-more difficult 
to measure, and can best be accomplished through identifying standards to assess the degree of 
socialization. 
                                                     
16 Li & Verhoeven (2015) offer a definition born from a comparative review between Beijing, 
Hong Kong, and Macau. Owing to Hong Kong’s and Macau’s colonial past, both have separate 
legal structures from the central PRC, with both Special Administrative Regions already having 
comprehensive counter-terror regimes.  
17 The metaphor of a child’s interactions is frequent in IST. For example, In Kai Alderson (2001), 
“We all know what internalization looks like when we are speaking about individuals: a child has 
internalized a social norm when he or she no longer needs to be told what to do…” (p. 418) and 
Johnston (2007), “Child socialization involves a child developing tastes, likes, and 
dislikes…though social interaction first with the family… (p. 5). 
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An effective, but impossible source to verify would be identifying the actual source of 
China’s domestic terrorism definition. However, absent honest and revelatory interviews with 
high-ranking statesmen,18 the degree of legal internalization from a non-native source would be 
difficult. Legal internalization is a frequently cited mechanism for measuring the degree of 
international socialization (e.g. Schimmelfennig, 1994; Alderson, 2001; Goodman & Jinks, 2004). 
The process of internalization, however, is far-more complex: states can be driven to adopt law by 
virtue of their standing (global power), proximity, coercive factors, or simple choice (Johnston, 
2007; Ikenberry & Kupchan, 1990). Proximity and global standing factors are the most-relevant 
to China, given the state’s growing international integration and status as a potential superpower. 
However, IST points toward looking at the probable outcome of recent and passed legislation—
that the definition came from somewhere else and was thus “transplanted.” 
This paper assumes the existence of legal transplants as an extant phenomenon, but that 
stance is not without controversy. Legal transplants, and the study therein, like international 
socialization, are heavily dependent on factors such as: timing and occurrence, elites, sources, and 
other socio-economic conditions (Ikenberry & Kupchan, 1990; Markovits, 2004). Some post-
modernists question the fundamental assumptions outright, dismissing the study, labeling all law 
as “socially determined” and describing analysis as “a function of the interpreter's epistemological 
assumptions, which are themselves historically and culturally conditioned” (Legrand, 1997 in 
Markovits, 2004, pp. 95-96). Legal transplants can be measured and compared, such as in the 
works of Alan Watson (1993) and Jeffrey Reeves (2016), who assume “savvy lawyers” and 
academics frequently influence the governmental adoption of global legal principles. 
                                                     
18 I say states “men” purposefully, as China is notoriously insulated to women in positions of 
leadership in the post-Mao era. 
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A SOCIALIZED CHINA? 
 
Assuming the existence of legal transplants, the importance of describing what a 
“socialized” terrorism legal transplant might look like is paramount. I incorporate Ann Kent’s 
(2002) three-part test of socialization. The Kent test proposes a measurement of socialization 
specific to China and other non-liberal states: Given China’s wide-participation in global 
international organizations, three standards can measure the socialization of a legal principle:  
“China's readiness to redefine its actual interests, including its implementation of 
international norms in domestic law and practice; China's preparedness to renegotiate its 
sovereignty in response to organizational and treaty pressures; and the degree to which 
China shows a readiness to shoulder the costs, as well as enjoy the benefits, of 
organizational participation (Kent, 2002, p. 349-350). 
 
The first standard is easily measured through tracking the changes in China’s preferential nature 
for defining terrorism and the inception of a counterterrorism law, but the “international norm” 
requires a construction of an international trajectory—which this paper tackles by looking at the 
legal development of terrorism internationally over time. The renegotiation of sovereignty 
standard and the shouldering of costs require additional work. 
 The final two standards of “renegotiation of sovereignty” and “shouldering costs” must be 
measured through looking at China’s attitude toward domestic versus international convention. 
Given China’s historical proclivity to remain nativist and reject internationalization, a change in 
trajectory would mark a positive outcome for socialization. Mirroring this sort of examination, a 
pivotal study conducted by Francisco O. Ramirez, Yasemin Soysal, and Suzanne Shanahan (1997) 
examined the relationship between legitimacy and proximity by analyzing trends in adopting 
women’s suffrage rights. When a norm becomes important, and neighboring countries begin to 
adopt the norm, the likelihood the domestic government will follow-suit is high (1997). Other 
factors include the “bandwagon effect,” rendering domestic forces almost irrelevant due to the 
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degree of international pressure (Hawkins & Hums, 2002). However, states also frequently 
abandon the robustness of legal principles from one country to another (Goodman & Jinks, 2004, 
p. 652). Despite potential issues associated with robustness, the relationship aspect could be very 
strong between China, regional organizations, and other broadly-scoped international actors. This 
paper contributes to the scholarship on international socialization though a comprehensive 
examination of country, regional, and IGO definitions of terrorism, and how these institutions 
relate to and pull from one another. The key takeaway: China seems to be moving away from 
defining terrorism as a strictly domestic concern to include international authority, especially 
within the context of organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Examining China’s definition of terrorism in an international context requires two sets of 
data: compositional elements of international terrorism definitions, and the same from China. 
Using online research collected from the United Nations Counter-terrorism Committee (CTC), two 
international legislative databases, and one online dual-language (Chinese and English) database 
specific to China’s own legislative procurements, I thematically coded each report and law on ten 
standards frequently appearing in international definitions of terrorism. Then, through thematically 
charting said standards by the date of first appearance, I show clustered trends in how terrorism 
“has” and “is” defined. Finally, I use the charted material to generate: a global international 
definition of terrorism, a set of regional definitions of terrorism, and a Chinese definition of 
terrorism. Juxtaposing China’s definition to both the regional and international definitions I 
generate an answer whether China’s definition is a product of international socialization, or an 





The data I obtained from the United Nations Security Council CTC is a unique form of 
data due to the CTC’s comprehensive coverage of most countries, the individual interpretive 
analysis coming from each submitting state, and the legitimacy granted from the reports coming 
from the highest organ of international power—the United Nations. Pursuant to United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), the United Nations Counter-terrorism Committee (CTC) 
collected and compiled Country Reports on 747 submissions from 196 submitters, usually by UN 
Member States.19 The primary concern of the Country Reports was to assess how each state met 
the requirements of UNSCR 1373. In a surprising boon, the Reports also frequently cite how each 
party defines terrorism. 20  Resolution 1624 (2005) built-upon Resolution 1373, adding the 
requirement of reporting to the CTC measures to combat the incitement of terrorist acts and to 
strengthen border controls, but with far-fewer submissions and submitters, totaling 115 and 110 
respectively.21 Given the absence of a “Global Counter-Terrorism Legislation Database” (Shor, 
2011), the CTC collection is the most-comprehensive listing of international legislation and the 
interpretive methods countries use in defining terrorist activities.  Further, many data sources of 
international and domestic law have been filtered by translation or come from non-native 
understandings of domestic institutions, inviting individual and unofficial interpretations of state 
statute—the state-sponsored statutory interpretation in the CTC Reports eliminated reporting bias 
                                                     
19  Four of the submission parties, the Cook Islands, the Organization for Security and Co-
Operation in Europe (OSCE), European Union, and UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK)  
20 In certain cases, such as Afghanistan’s second submission, S/2003/353, the country identifies 
the lack of counterterrorism law and then attempts to list qualifiers that might meet a future 
definition of terrorism. 
21 It should be noted that 51 of the submitters concurrently submitted documents pursuant both 
UNSCR 1373 and 1624. These instances were marked as, “See: S/XXXX (Year)/XXX”. For 
example, Andorra submitted S/2006/309 to fulfill the requirements of both UNSCRs. 
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on my end. Finally, given the legitimacy of government reports in general, but especially reports 
coming from supranational intergovernmental organs like the United Nations, the CTC Reports 
have the additional benefit of being a broadly-legitimated source for collecting definitions of 
terrorism.  
Serving as both a supplement and check to legislation discovered in the UNSC Counter-
terrorism Committee Country Reports, I also utilized searches and legislation in two widely 
circulated and utilized databases: Legislationonline and South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP). I 
focused solely on legislation containing definitions or statutes dealing with acts of terrorism. 
Legislationonline contains legislative sources from 52 country collections from North America, 
Europe, and Central Asia. SATP’s legislative selection is more-limited than Legislationonline, 
containing country legislative documents from six South Asian countries: Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Each country’s page has a comprehensive listing of “Acts 
and Ordinances,” ordered by date. Legislationonline and SATP together cover most regions of the 
world and give a secondary check to the CTC—jointly providing limited breadth and manageable 
depth for a thesis project.  However, a larger project could conceivably utilize other databases 
covering more areas and wider legislative options.  
Three other supplementary sets of data I consulted were the United Nations Treaty 
Collection and Peking University’s Chinalawinfo. I searched the UN Treaty Collection for 
conventions concerning the issue of terrorism, and noted each convention’s membership totals. As 
for PKU’s Chinalawinfo, I searched for Chinese policy and law involving terrorism in order to 
serve as the baseline for comparison of my study. 
Other equally comprehensive (if not more so) databases exist for the purposes of data 
collection. However, I decided against using WorldLII, HeinOnline, Lexadin and WestLaw. The 
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three databases are too comprehensive for the nature of my project, offering thousands of 
legislative and judicial citations of the word “terrorism.” While the substantial provision of data 
would narrow my findings, I would spend five years doing the work. I may revisit the data in the 
future to strengthen the integrity my results through providing not only legislative, but also judicial 
opinions on terrorism specific to each country. Another practical concern was linguistics—Lexadin 
does not always contain English translation and given my limited readership of only Chinese and 
English, I could not use the information. Each of the comprehensive capabilities of WorldLII, 
HeinOnline, Lexadin and WestLaw offer future potential to researchers looking to investigate 
deeper into the country-specific interpretations of terrorism I code in my study. However, I decided 
against using those points of data. 
To discover how the Chinese government approaches definitions of terrorism, I will 
examine China’s publicly-available statutory legal history from 1997-to-present. In doing so, I will 
look at the 36 laws promulgated and decisions from the National People’s Congress and Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress. The areas of law covered include: constitutional, 
government affairs, national security, foreign affairs, public security, civil law, banking & finance, 
post & telecommunications, culture, criminal law, criminal litigation, and judicial assistance. In 
limiting my selection to the highest legal authorities in China, I was able to receive the clearest 
national understanding of how terrorism is defined as opposed to sub-national actors, where the 
results in a federal system could be variable. While a thorough examination of every-level of 
Chinese terrorism definition and application would provide additional insight to how the Chinese 
state congruently (from the top-down) defines terrorism, such an examination would escape the 






I rely solely on online research gathering techniques for investigating the legal definition 
of terrorism internationally. The most-challenging collection was through the United Nations 
Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee website. Once on the site, the Country Reports 
listed fall into two categories: Resolution 1373 (2001) and Resolution 1624 (2005). I reviewed 
each report from each available link. I am unfamiliar with alternative methods to review the reports, 
as I was unable to locate any comprehensive listing, comparison, or reporting of the material. 
Legislationonline and South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) each have individual mechanisms for 
gathering legislative material. Legislationonline allows for a “Search by Topic” on the left pane. 
Upon clicking the link to “Counter-Terrorism,” a selection emerges of 52 countries. Each country 
contains listings for: “Primary legislation,” Secondary legislation,” “Case-law,” and “Others.”  I 
consulted only listings under the “Primary legislation” to narrow the scope of the search. South 
Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) lists 6 countries, each with a clickable drop-down menu. The 
“Documents” tab, when clicked, takes the navigator to the respective country’s listings of: “Acts 
and Ordinances” and “Papers.”  While alternative methods for gathering legal information exist, 
the most-prevalent form of late is to utilize international legal databases, which often contain 
translated and easily navigable material. 
ANALYSIS 
 
I employed thematic content analysis to methodologically code and sort through data. After 
obtaining my legislative sources, I examined each for definitions and components of the law. 
Borrowing from the methodology of Alex P. Schmid (2004), I utilized ten categories to search 
thematically through: demonstrative use, threat, terror (population), civilians, coercion 
(government) tactic/strategy, communication, illegal/criminal, political character, and 
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psychological warfare. Each instance received a single code, but I do not account for multiple 
listings—only the general existence of a definition within each law. Additionally, I notate both the 
date of passage of the law as well as the submission (for the UN CTC documents). I did not account 
for any further deletions of law (repeals, reconsiderations, or court decisions), which would impact 
the findings. Additionally, when coding for dates, I coded all instances prior to 2001 as “2001” to 
show consistency through instances where the original date of passage for the countries’ domestic 
laws were unclear. Unfortunately, this likely served to skew data later as an average, but less-
severe as one might expect, as 1/3 22  of the occurrences of “2001” within the 
CTC/SATP/Legislationonline data were isolated to the Illegal/Criminal standard, which was 
triggered by either the characterization of terrorism as an illegal/criminal act, or the act of terrorism 
being codified in criminal law. In the end, I was left with 775 documents coded for ten frequently 
occurring standards present in international definitions of terrorism.  
The analysis of the international conventions and regional agreements each filled a 
different analytical purpose. The conventions served as evidence for China’s compliance with 
international norms, such as acceding to, signing, and ratifying conventions related to terrorism. 
The regional agreements to which China is either a party or observer (or equivalent) functioned 
similarly to the CTC/SATP/Legislationonline data, where definitions were coded by standard and 
the first appearance of the standard within multiple iterations and policy documents of the 
conventions. I then compared the definitions within the regional agreements to China’s own 
definitions.  
                                                     




GLOBAL NORMS V. CHINA 
DOMESTIC CHINESE NORMS: CHANGING TERRORISM DEFINITIONS IN CHINA 
 
Before exploring regional and international conceptions of terrorism, it is important to first 
establish how China, the point of comparison, views and has viewed terrorism. The background 
section already explains the process of legislative adoption in China, but there is difficulty in 
imagining the relationship between sets of law without visual representation: 
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As the table above illustrates, there are several competing methods through which China 
defined and expressed definitions of terrorism but can best be summed up in two categories: 
domestic and international convention. The international dimension includes both the self-reported 
CTC Reports, as well as treaty-obligated definitions developed through international and multi-
state consultation.  The domestic-sense’s definition, realized through the Counter Terrorism Law, 
includes the standards of: Illegal/Criminal, Demonstrative Use/Intent, Terror (Population), 
Coercion (Government), Threat, and Political Character. Many of these standards appeared in 
                                                     
23 Includes both Criminal Code Definitions as well as Decisions issued by State Council. 
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other earlier decisions and treaty obligations reflecting both an evolving and standing definition of 
terrorism at the customary level.  
The international-sense took shape beginning in 2001, through both China’s CTC 
Reporting and accession to the Shanghai Convention. China reported as early as its 2001 CTC 
Submission, standards of Illegal/Criminal, Terror (Population), and Threat(s).  The Decision of the 
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Approving the Shanghai Convention 
on Combating Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism (2001) includes a definition of terrorism 
holding the following standards: Illegal/Criminal, Demonstrative Use/Intent, Terror (Population), 
Coercion (Government), and Civilians.24 The disconnect between the domestic and international 
zone of China’s terrorism definitions could be a sign of international engagement taking priority 
over domestic installation of law, but it could also be a sign of general insincerity regarding 
terrorism as a legal institution. At least in terms of stated interpretation: China’s definition of 
terrorism has evolved from an internationally agreed-upon definition into domestic statute. 
However, the trajectory is incomplete without situating the definition both substantively and 
longitudinally within the international sense. 
CHINA V. CONSENSUS MAPPING OF TERRORISM DEFINITIONS: CTC, LEGISLATIONONLINE, AND 
SATP 
 
 The CTC was tasked under UNSCR 1373 (2001) with the monitoring of the 
implementation of the resolution, as well as assessing the needs and structures within each member 
                                                     
24 Article 1, Section 1 of The Shanghai Convention on Combatting Terrorism (2001) 
(http://eng.sectsco.org/load/202907/) defines terrorism as: “any other act intended to cause death 
or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or any other person not taking an active part in the 
hostilities in a situation of armed conflict or to cause major damage to any material facility, as 
well as to organize, plan, aid and abet such act, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or 
context, is to intimidate population, violate public security or compel public authorities or an 
international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, and prosecuted in accordance 
with the national laws of the Parties.” 
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state of the United Nations through reporting back to the Committee. 25  Membership of the 
Committee was-and-is composed of current members of the Security Council, and was further 
given timetable reporting authority for state compliance.26 Between the years of 2001 and 2016, 
664 reports were submitted by 192 member states, with each report reflecting varying levels of 
state compliance and correspondence between the Committee and the member state. 
Nearly all states reported some-level of conception of terrorism, while relatively few opted 
to not define the concept. Although not immediately clear as to why states opted to, en masse, 
engage in reporting their respective domestic definitions of terrorism, it could be attributable to 
the multiple sections of the resolution mandating actions, reporting, and cooperation against 
“terrorist acts,” incentivizing the provision of what a terrorist act “is” according to the laws and 
codes of each state. As a supplement to these reports, and for consistency across results, I have 








                                                     
25 See: UNSCR 1373, Section 6: “Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its 
provisional rules of 
procedure, a Committee of the Security Council, consisting of all the members of the Council, to 
monitor implementation of this resolution, with the assistance of appropriate expertise, and calls 
upon all States to report to the Committee, no later than 90 days from the date of adoption of this 
resolution and thereafter according to a timetable to be proposed by the Committee, on the steps 








Terrorism’s definition should include the standards of Illegal/Criminal, Demonstrative Use 
(Intent), and Terror (Population) if one is generous and takes a majoritarian approach to defining 
terrorism. However, a less-generous application has only one standard, Illegal/Criminal, showing 
a high-degree of convergence among state definitions of terrorism. Among the data: 189 countries 
(98.44%) identify terrorism as an Illegal/Criminal act, 113 (58.85%) identify terrorism as having 
Demonstrative Use (Intent), 106 (55.21%) identify terrorism as having Terror (Population), 92 
(47.92%) identify terrorism to include Threats, 83 (43.23%) identify terrorism as having a 
Coercion (Government) component, 39 (20.31%) identify Communication(s) as being a target of 
terrorism, 33 (17.19%) identify terrorism has having a Political Character/Purpose, 13 (6.77%) 
identify terrorism as targeting civilians, 4 (2.08%) identify terrorism as having a having a 
Psychological Warfare component, and 3 (1.56%) identify terrorism as having a Tactic/Strategy 
component. Among reporting states: there was a notable and troubling trend, wherein 1/3 of states 
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either did not specify a definition of terrorism or did not make clear that the act of terrorism was a 
crime. Some of the “lack” could be attributed to the lack in requiring the submission of a formal 
definition but given that many states were asked for specific statutes in subsequent review by the 
CTC, the definition likely would have appeared if present in domestic law. 
A different set of standards emerge as having a high-degree of convergence when 
controlling for countries that have either no response or only respond with the standard of 
Illegal/Criminal—Demonstrative Use/Intent, Terror (Population), Threat(s), and Coercion 
(Government) are all elevated to in-excess of 2/3 of states.  When removing countries both non-
responsive countries (4 or 2.08%) and countries only identifying terrorism as having an 
Illegal/Criminal component (66 or 34.38%), the breakdown becomes: 100% Illegal/Criminal, 
92.62% Demonstrative Use (Intent), 86.89% Terror (Population), 75.40% Threats, 68.03% 
Coercion (Government), 31.97% Communication, 27.05% Political Character/Purpose, 10.66% 
Civilians, 3.27% Psychological Warfare, and 2.46% Tactic/Strategy. Interestingly, China could be 
said to meet both the non-reporting and reported definitions of terrorism. While China’s definition 
of terrorism evolved in multiple spheres (international and domestic) over the course of nearly two 
decades, and exhibited resistive factors of domestic installation, China’s international compliance 
was and remains clear.  
Critical to showing longitudinal trajectory are both the average first year of installation of 
a standard, as well as the breakdown of each standard into percentage of convergence by year. 
Among all countries, on average, individual standards were first adopted at the following years: 
Illegal/ Criminal: 2001.43, Demonstrative Use (Intent): 2002.7, Terror (Population): 2002.97, 
Threat: 2002.99, Civilians: 2006.46, Coercion (Government): 2003.34, Tactic/ Strategy: 2003, 
Communication: 2003.21, Political Character/ Purpose: 2003.76, and Psychological Warfare: 
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2004.25. However, again, a significant proportion of countries never adopted any standard other 
than Illegal/Criminal. This breakdown of adoption and broader timing is addressed in Table 2 
below: 
Table 2: Percentage of Countries Having Already Adopted Standard(s) By Date of First 
Appearance 
 Percentage By Year 
Standard Never 2001 or Sooner 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 (+) 
Illegal/ Criminal 2.08% 53.13% 90.63% 96.35% 97.40% 97.40% 97.40% 97.40% 97.92% 97.92% 97.92% 
Demonstrative 
Use (Intent) 41.15% 26.04% 39.58% 46.35% 50.52% 51.56% 54.17% 54.69% 55.21% 55.73% 58.85% 
Terror 
(Population) 44.79% 25.00% 34.90% 40.63% 45.31% 47.40% 48.96% 49.48% 50.52% 51.56% 55.21% 
Threat(s) 52.08% 21.88% 31.25% 36.46% 39.06% 39.58% 41.67% 42.71% 43.23% 44.27% 47.92% 
Coercion 
(Government) 56.77% 15.10% 24.48% 30.73% 35.42% 35.42% 36.46% 36.98% 38.02% 39.58% 43.23% 
Communication 79.69% 7.81% 10.42% 15.63% 16.67% 17.19% 18.23% 18.75% 18.75% 18.75% 20.31% 
Political 
Character/ 
Purpose 82.81% 6.25% 9.38% 11.46% 11.98% 12.50% 14.58% 14.58% 14.58% 14.58% 17.19% 
Civilians 93.23% 1.56% 2.60% 2.60% 2.60% 3.13% 3.65% 3.65% 4.69% 5.21% 6.77% 
Psychological 
Warfare 97.92% 1.04% 1.04% 1.04% 1.04% 1.04% 1.56% 1.56% 1.56% 2.08% 2.08% 
Tactic/ Strategy 98.44% 0.52% 0.52% 1.04% 1.04% 1.56% 1.56% 1.56% 1.56% 1.56% 1.56% 
 
China’s (1) readiness to redefine its interests by implementing international norms in 
domestic law and practice is apparent based-upon a preliminary look at when significant 
percentages of states first adopted standards of defining terrorism. As early as 2001, China was 
reporting definitional components of: Illegal/Criminal, Terror (Population), and Threat(s), which 
all would show as longitudinal constants consistent with global trends in Illegal/Criminal (53.13% 
adopted by 2001), and significantly ahead of global trends in Terror (25.00% adopted by 2001) 
and Threat (21.88% adopted by 2001), and Coercion (15.10% by 2001). China further bucks 
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international trends with the definition(s) adopted through the treaties and international 
agreements: Civilians (1.56% adopted by 2001), Political Character/Purpose (14.58% adopted by 
2009), and Threat(s) (44.27% adopted by 2009). The standards themselves have become normative 
through both wide-spread usage and linguistic frequency, and China’s readiness to adopt the 
standards into domestic and international positions meet the standard put forth by Kent. The 
argument becomes even-stronger when implementing the same controls from earlier—countries 
that have either no response or only respond with the standard of Illegal/Criminal: 
Table 3: Percentage of Countries Having Already Adopted Standard(s) By Date of First 
Appearance; Controlling for Illegal/Criminal and Non-Responding Countries 
 Percentage By Year 
Standard Never 2001 or Sooner 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 (+) 
Illegal/ 
Criminal 0.00% 67.21% 95.08% 97.54% 99.18% 99.18% 99.18% 99.18% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Demonstrative 
Use (Intent) 7.38% 40.98% 62.30% 72.95% 79.51% 81.15% 85.25% 86.07% 86.89% 87.70% 92.62% 
Terror 
(Population) 13.11% 39.34% 54.92% 63.93% 71.31% 74.59% 77.05% 77.87% 79.51% 81.15% 86.89% 
Threat(s) 24.59% 34.43% 49.18% 57.38% 61.48% 62.30% 65.57% 67.21% 68.03% 69.67% 75.41% 
Coercion 
(Government) 31.97% 23.77% 38.52% 48.36% 55.74% 55.74% 57.38% 58.20% 59.84% 62.30% 68.03% 
Communication 68.03% 12.30% 16.39% 24.59% 26.23% 27.05% 28.69% 29.51% 29.51% 29.51% 31.97% 
Political 
Character/ 
Purpose 72.95% 9.84% 14.75% 18.03% 18.85% 19.67% 22.95% 22.95% 22.95% 22.95% 27.05% 
Civilians 89.34% 2.46% 4.10% 4.10% 4.10% 4.92% 5.74% 5.74% 7.38% 8.20% 10.66% 
Psychological 
Warfare 96.72% 1.64% 1.64% 1.64% 1.64% 1.64% 2.46% 2.46% 2.46% 3.28% 3.28% 
Tactic/ Strategy 97.54% 0.82% 0.82% 1.64% 1.64% 2.46% 2.46% 2.46% 2.46% 2.46% 2.46% 
 
China remains largely ahead of the rest of the world in adopting standards. Again, 
Illegal/Criminal, Terror (Population), and Threat(s) all would show as longitudinal constants 
consistent with global trends in Illegal/Criminal (67.21% adopted by 2001), and significantly 
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ahead of global trends in Terror (39.34% adopted by 2001) and Threat (34.43% adopted by 2001), 
and Coercion (23.77% by 2001). Through standards present in treaties and international 
agreements, China’s definitions are ahead with: Civilians (2.46% adopted by 2001), and Political 
Character/Purpose 22.95% adopted by 2009). However, China’s late adoption of Threat(s) 
(69.67% adopted by 2009) is the only instance where China fell behind the rest of the controlled 
countries. As early as 2005, 62.30% (nearly 2/3) of the controlled group had adopted the standard. 
A second key component of Kent’s first standard, implementing international norms 
in…practice encounters similar difficulty as other forms of research relating to China’s treatment 
and prosecution of terrorism suspects—we cannot know how China treats suspects because the 
information is not widely available. However, if we examine the legal structure as it relates to 
procedural rights and protections, specifically due process rights, and how each fits within an 
international context, a limited scope of understanding is to be had.  
GLOBAL NORMS: DEFINING TERRORISM NORMS THROUGH TREATY, CONVENTION, AND 
MULTILATERALISM  
 
In this section, I utilize China’s membership in international agreements as a measurement of 
China’s international socialization. Further, I offer a unified supplement to the first section, where 
I compare regional agreements’ language on terrorism to China’s. 
OPEN MEMBERSHIP INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND CHINA 
 International conventions, whether open or regionally restricted, are one of the highest 
forms of international conventional and customary law. Conventional law binds states party to 
international agreements and customary law binds states that are not. Fifteen open membership 
international anti-terrorism conventions and protocols have been signed and adopted since 1963. I 
chose to focus on the 13 most widely adopted and currently in-force conventions and protocols as 
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a source of comparison.27 Despite the widespread success in adopting the conventions, none go as 
far as to define terrorism, limiting the scope of conventional law. China’s increasing presence in 
the treaty process, however, is noteworthy: the state is a party to all but one major international 
counterterrorism treaty.   
China’s international socialization begins in acceding to international conventions and 
treaties. China’s increasing participation in international conventions, treaties, and regional 
organizations is well-documented, and often cited as a reason explaining China’s international 
socialization (Panda 2006; Li 2016; In examining Table 4, the vast-majority of countries are a 
party to each international convention or treaty concerning terrorism. Likewise, with the exception 
of the Plastic Explosives Convention (1991), the People’s Republic of China is a party as well.  
Table 4: International Conventions and Chinese Participation28 
Treaty/Convention Name Year  # of Parties China Adopted 
Tokyo Convention 1963 186 1979 
Hague Convention 1970 185 1980 
Sabotage Convention/Montreal 1971 188 1980 
Diplomatic Agents Convention 1973 180 1987 
Hostages Convention 1979 176 1993 
Nuclear Materials Convention 1980 155 1989 
Airport Protocol 1988 188 1980 
Maritime Convention 1988 166 1991 
Fixed Platform Protocol 1988 155 1991 
Plastic Explosives Convention 1991 153 no 
Terrorist Bombings Convention 1997 170 2001 
Terrorist Financing Convention 1999 188 2006 
Nuclear Terrorism Convention 2005 109 2010 
 
Although China has yet to formally declare acceptance of the Plastic Explosives 
Convention, it has indicated an interest, indicating the only non-accessioned treaty is still an active 
socialization project. Designed to track and prevent the manufacturing of unmarked explosives, 
                                                     
27 Both the 2010 Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil 
Aviation (Beijing Convention) and 2010 Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Beijing Protocol) have been adopted, but currently 
lack the signatures necessary to be in force. 
28 For a comprehensive listing of citations for each convention and party, see Appendix. 
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the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, more commonly 
referred to as, “The Plastic Explosives Convention,” was adopted at the 1991 Montreal meeting of 
the International Conference on Air Law, and took effect on 21 June 1998 after the 35th party 
ratified the agreement (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2004). Despite not signing the 
initial agreement, and having yet to accede, the People’s Republic of China claimed to be actively 
“conducting an in-depth study” of the Convention (Wang, 2004; CTC S/2004/342).  The claim 
was later reiterated in China’s CTC submission in response to a question from the Committee 
(Wang, 2006, S/2006/470). Still a non-party, China has yet to outright dismiss the Convention, 
signaling that the country may-yet still accede, erasing any anomaly.  
MAJOR REGIONAL AGREEMENTS AND CHINA 
 In conjunction with rising global pressures in the post-9/11 era, regional agreements are 
likely the source of where China’s definition of terrorism transformed from international policy 
into domestic law. China is an observer state to dozens of international agreements, conventions, 
and treaties dealing with subject matter related to terrorism. Four key memberships and each 
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Much in the same way of other international agreements and adaptions of the definition of 
terrorism, each iteration of the listed international agreements adapted and changed over time. 
Among the listed documents, one stands out: The Convention on Counter-Terrorism of the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The definitional standards between the agreement’s 
definition and China’s domestic law (as of 2016) are identical. In fact, this stands alone outside 
the 14 or 7.29% of countries sharing the same composition of terrorism standards as China, with 
China and Uzbekistan as the only SCO members sharing the same definitions.29  
China meets both the second and third of Kent’s standards through its broad participation, 
negotiation, and adaptation in response to treaty pressures surrounding the definition of terrorism.  
Standard (2) renegotiation of sovereignty in response to organizational and treaty pressures is 
difficult to calculate beyond a simple “yes/no” accession to treaty and compliance question. 
                                                     
29 Both Azerbaijan and Turkey also share the definition, but are only “Dialogue Partners” with 
the SCO, and not full members. 
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However, upon closer examination (especially of the Shanghai Convention), it is evident that 
China is engaging in sovereign renegotiation. For example, Article 9, Section 1 of The Convention 
of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization against Terrorism (2009) mandates, “the following 
intentional acts shall be recognized as criminal offenses by all Parties, and necessary legislative 
measures shall be adopted accordingly…”  (criminalizing specific acts of terrorism are listed). 
Questions of jurisdiction, perhaps the most fundamental of legal sovereignty renegotiations are 
also handled under the Convention, wherein Parties cede authority to international bodies and 
instruments under circumstances of transnational terrorist attacks.30 In addition to the authority 
ceded in answering questions and agreeing to compliance requirements associated with UNSCR 
1373,31 China has shown the practical step of implementing a domestic law with significant 
international characteristics—something that would likely not have happened if the country 
exhibited resistive qualities to defining terrorism.  
The third standard, shouldering both the costs and benefits of organizational participation, 
indicates some sort of responsibility tied to organizational membership. Specific to organizations 
and conventions dealing with terrorism, China is either a full Party (carrying different levels of 
responsibility depending on the treaty, but certainly bound to all of the rules and regulations 
within), or an observer (or equivalent) which also carries responsibility. The costs are reflected in 
some of the previous discussion related to obligations and secession of sovereignty, but the benefits 
could include: stronger regional ties, cooperation on transnational issues (in this case, terrorism), 
                                                     
30 Ex: See Article 3.  
31 Could have vetoed the requirements of this Resolution, but opted not to, showing a willingness 




and specific partnerships with individual states. Especially on the final benefit, China has 
undertaken several initiatives and agreements with individual SCO states.32    
In a larger context of socialization, China has accepted significant costs in order to join 
international organizations and seek legitimacy. The most-obvious example of this has been 
China’s continued adaptation and adjusting of law to join the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
where significant market reforms, a collapse of state-owned enterprises, loss of industrial 
competitiveness, and destruction of China’s ability to control its own market (Gao Shangquan in 
Kent 2002, p. 356; Pekkanen 2010, p. 530).  Concurrently, China has also acceded to multiple 
international agreements in other areas of security, nuclear weapons reduction, and human rights 
(Wan 2007),33 which historically had been against China’s domestic interests, but the government 
determined them to be unavoidable and necessary (Kent 2002, p. 353). The same has happened in 
defining terrorism, where China has shouldered both the costs of cooperating in regional 
organizations, allowed the international community to lead on defining the issue (Panda 2006), 
and reaped the benefits of that leadership through redefining domestic issues to be in-line with 
international concerns.34 
                                                     
32 Outside of the ratifications of each iteration of the SCO Convention, China has standing and 
formal counter-terrorism working agreements with: Turkmenistan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan (See: 
http://en.pkulaw.cn.www2.lib.ku.edu/Search/SearchLaw.aspx). 
33 Wan argues that the economic reforms since 1978 “necessitated introduction of laws that meet 
"the international standards" and has gradually reshaped Chinese national identity. Western 
rights pressure on China since the 1989 Tiananmen Incident has made it necessary for Beijing to 
characterize its legal reform as evidence of progress in human rights” (2007, p. 728). 
34 It could be said that one of the “benefits” reaped by China’s socialization and adoption of 
international standards of defining terrorism is the ability to redefine domestic human rights 




COUNTER POINT 1: CHINA IS USING THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM (NORMS) TO JUSTIFY 
OPPRESSIVE LEGAL PRACTICE 
 
Conventional wisdom is, with each new legal update regarding issues of security and crime, 
China is becoming a more punitive and ruthless regime. In the minds of critics: China is not 
currently undergoing socialization, but rather, is artfully using the international system and norms 
related to counter-terrorism to justify human rights abuses, specifically within the Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region (XUAR). The argument contains three assumptions: one, China’s rhetoric 
surrounding anti-Uyghur activity changed after 9/11 to reflect international language surrounding 
terrorism, but in practice remained the same (Pokalova 2013); two, China seeks to enhance state 
power, and using international language makes that easier (Wang 2000); and three, China is facing 
massive internal pressure to behave in such a way that completely undermines the socialization 
narrative.  
It is entirely likely (and probable) that China is using and, in some cases, abusing the 
international system for domestic gains by the leadership (which carries implications for the due 
process argument in the next sub-section). In practice, while China has acceded to multiple 
conventions concerning human rights and terrorism, the state still mass-incarcerates, forcibly 
relocates, forces into re-education, and indefinitely monitors the daily lives of Uyghur people. 
However, practice aside, China has steadily adopted international language and definitions as it 
relates to terrorism, which begs the question: if China wanted to either maintain or steadily increase 
the volume of violence committed against Uyghur people, why adopt international norms to justify 




Shortly after 9/11, broad consensus existed to redirect the fight against terrorism to a more-
serious area. The UN took-up multiple resolutions and conventions to further strengthen the 
international community’s ability to fight, defund, and prevent acts of terrorism. The result was 
the creation of an international hegemonic power of socialization, where the international 
community compelled change in states (including China). According to Ikenberry and Kupchan, 
“when socialization occurs, the hegemon is able to secure the compliance…without resorting to 
material sanctions and inducements” (1990, p.290). This point is even-stronger in the instance of 
China, where it retains veto-authority by virtue of its position as a Security Council member—
China chose to comply with international pressure. 
Much like the first standard, both (2) China’s seeking of state power and (3) internal 
pressure can be explained by international socialization. While China’s venturing toward 
international hegemony has been characterized as revisionist by many, others choose to identify 
China’s pursuit of power as pushing new principles into the existing international system—
creating an “Eastphallian” vision of the future, within the present Westphalian (Lo 2010). Lo 
contends that China’s foreign policy is guided by the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,” 
among which include:  
1. Mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty; 2. Mutual nonaggression; 3. 
Mutual noninterference in internal affairs; 4. Equality and mutual benefit; and 5. Peaceful 
coexistence (Lo, 2010, 17). 
 
It could be that China’s pursuit of state power necessitates a social atmosphere, wherein the 
mutuality of many of the Principles requires communication, idea exchange, and respect of non-
native standards. In the instance of terrorism, a non-native concept, China has chosen to adopt 




 Internal pressure to change overriding the effects of socialization ignores the role that elites 
play within the decision-making apparatus of China’s political system. The ruling elites, many 
having been foreign-educated, often in western elite institutions, while also exposed to “diplomatic 
channels and cultural exchanges” (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990, p. 290), are in a unique position 
to take-in foreign standards of thought and rule—an exclusive phenomenon according to Ikenberry 
and Kupchan (1990). The push and pull factors of instability, ethnic separatism, while serving as 
the impetus for action, do not serve as the modus operandi for the action. Elites make choices on 
how to proceed, how to rule, and how to make law based-upon what they have learned and what 
they know. If the history of the Cultural Revolution taught anything to current elites, it is that rule 
by law is a better alternative than rule by man, as not even the “human rights of a former state 
president, Liu Shaoqi, were not guaranteed” (Yu Haocheng in Wan 2007, p. 739).35 The adoption 
of an internationally “accredited” definition of terrorism, in this respect, makes sense as a rule of 
law, foreign educated and considered phenomenon. 
COUNTER POINT 2: CHINA IS NOT EXPERIENCING INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIZATION, BUT RATHER, 
A PARTICIPANT IN MULTILATERALISM 
 
 In many respects, the phenomenon of international socialization could be seen as an 
extension of multilateralism—a community of states coming together to reach a solution to an 
issue. However, the two phenomenon are distinct: international socialization in illiberal states, as 
defined by Kent (2006), include the standards of:  
(1) readiness to redefine its actual interests, including its implementation of international 
norms in domestic law and practice; (2) a preparedness to renegotiate sovereignty in 
response to organizational and treaty pressures; and (3) the degree to which a state shows 
readiness to shoulder the costs, as well as enjoy the benefits, of organizational participation 
(p. 349-350) 
 
                                                     
35 How Xi Jinping’s clearing of term limits affects these considerations is unclear as of now since 
he has yet to assume a third term. 
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Multilateralism, on the other hand, is: 
In a literal sense, it means "the practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three 
or more states." But to scholars of multilateralism, this nominal definition falls short. It 
"misses the qualitative dimension of the phenomenon that makes it distinct." In contrast to 
nominal multilateralism, qualitative multilateralism refers to "an institutional form which 
coordinates behavior among three or more states on the basis of 'generalized' principles of 
conduct—that is, principles which specify appropriate conduct for a class of actions, 
without regard to the particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that 
may exist in any specific occurrence (Wang, 2000, 476). 
 
To determine whether China is engaging in either multilateralism or is being internationally 
socialized, it is instructive to first look at the timing of China’s definitional components of 
terrorism. 
 While it is true that China’s participation in international organizations, specifically 
regional agreements, likely influenced its decision-making apparatus on the adoption of certain 
standards of terrorism, many standards pre-dated the international agreements through which 
multilateral engagement relies upon. If true, the origin point of the standard would indicate a home-
grown standard at worst, but most-favorably an internationally socialized definition. As previously 
addressed, China reported as early as its 2001 CTC Submission, standards of Illegal/Criminal, 
Terror (Population), and Threat(s). Instructional to how these standards were viewed is how 
China’s team framed the discussion: these were standards extant in other criminal statutes framed 
as terrorism but not exclusively defined as terrorism.36 The Convention on Counter-Terrorism of 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), however, contains an explicit definition of 
terrorism. If China were participating in multilateral negotiations, one would expect the 
‘generalized principle’ to make it into Chinese national law, but it did not. 
The idea that China’s conduct is occurring in a solely multilateral capacity ignores the 
language of the standards, which are far too widely accepted for any small network of states to 
                                                     
36 See China’s UN CTC Submissions: S/2001/1270; S/2001/1270 Add. 1. 
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have contrived alone. If looking at the data from the CTC alone, hundreds of states are coming 
together identifying similar norms, rules, and standards for the definition of terrorism, despite the 
many differences within. The standards reached on the individual level, to some extent, are 
predictable, consistent, and use similar vernacular—something that would probably not exist in a 
multilateral vacuum. 
Finally, the timing of socialization can occur both before, during, and after an act of 
multilateral engagement. China is a Party/Observer to dozens of international organizations and 
agreements, and each state within each agreement could exhibit similar relationships.37 While 
many states could have come together to influence China’s decision-making in adopting certain 
linguistic characteristics in the Criminal Code, the larger force of the international community’s 
acceptance and drove probably exceeded the push and pull of one or two conventions. 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
China has both moved closer to international standards of defining terrorism, and in some 
cases, gone further in clarity than many prominent international actors. If one thing should be taken 
away from this paper, it is that China’s definition of terrorism, while new by statute, is neither new 
in practice nor conception. Both critical and less-skeptical parties of China’s 2015/16 
Counterterrorism Law can agree: China has historically defined terrorism in some capacity, and 
has (and continues to) commit human rights abuses. However, the definition itself can now be both 
situated domestically and internationally: the definitional standards within China’s 2015/16 
Counterterrorism Law have been extant, at the earliest 2001, but as late as 2009. The longevity of 
the 2001 standards, Illegal/Criminal, Demonstrative Use (Intent), Terror (Population), and 
                                                     




Coercion (Government) show congruency through 2015/16, and the addition of the 2009 standards 
of  Threat and Political Character/Purpose show a willingness to evolve further along the lines of 
international norms. 
Initially, I predicted the international definitional convergence of how to define terrorism 
would mark several departures from current Terrorism Studies literature, most-notably with 
“civilian targeting.” Despite data from other sources showing 41% of countries and international 
organizations and 36% of academia include “civilians” as a target of terrorism (Schmid, 2004), 
my research shows this not to be the case—13 Countries, or 6.77% are all I could show with the 
available data. Further, given the absence of “civilian” targeting and “political character” from all 
international organizations I reviewed, excluding ASEAN, I predict prior research into academic 
and legal convergence projects to either be incomplete or wrong. With these findings, I anticipate 
generating a reconceptualization of consensus techniques searching for a definition of terrorism.  
Another initial prediction I made was that China would largely fall within international 
norms of defining terrorism and that China’s statutory definition of terrorism would meet all 
elements of Ann Kent’s three-part test of international socialization. This proved to be the case. 
China has become a party to dozens of international terrorism conventions, been strongly 
influenced by foreign-trained academics within the legal system (Reeves, 2016), and continues to 
advocate for a greater internationalization of counterterrorism policy (Panda, 2006; Potter, 
2013)—the empirical and conceptual evidence strongly argue in favor of a socializing China. 
Given China’s recent history in previous socializations, such as environmental law (Barresi, 2013), 
and China’s relative increase in power parity over the last 10 years, the conditions are ripe for 
China to continue socializing even beyond terrorism, which would also help to satisfy Kent’s 
standards. After examining these conditions, I believe not only has China socialized in the area of 
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terrorism but has been on a path of further socialization for decades in multiple areas—security, 
trade, and human rights to name a few. 
Curiously, reports sponsored by the CTC never publicly took account for any formal 
standardization of laws and definitions of terrorism when reports were submitted to the body. In 
terms of the discipline of Terrorism Studies, this paper offers the contribution of a new definition 
of international terrorism by consensus and a case-study situating a new contribution, China, to 
the mix. In my opinion, the data from this study has a wide-variety of uses, ranging from applying 
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Belarus CTC REPORT 2005 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 2001 2001 2001 0 
Belarus CTC REPORT 2006 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 2001 2001 2001 0 
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Belgium CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
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Belgium LEGONL REPORT 2014 2003 0 2003 0 2003 0 0 2001 0 0 
Belize CTC REPORT 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Belize CTC REPORT 2003 2003 2003 2003 0 2003 0 2003 2001 0 0 
Benin CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Benin CTC REPORT 2005 2005 0 2005 0 0 0 2005 2002 0 0 
Benin CTC REPORT 2006 2005 0 2005 0 0 0 2005 2002 0 0 
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Bolivia CTC REPORT 2002 2002 0 2002 0 2002 0 0 2002 0 0 
Bolivia CTC REPORT 2003 2002 0 2002 0 2002 0 0 2002 0 0 
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CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
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CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
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LEGONL LAW 2003 2003 2003 2003 2003 2003 0 0 2001 0 0 
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CTC REPORT 2006 2006 2006 2006 0 2006 0 2006 2001 2006 0 
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LEGONL LAW 2015 2006 2006 2006 2015 2006 0 2006 2001 2006 0 
Botswana CTC REPORT 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Botswana CTC REPORT 2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Brazil CTC REPORT 2001 2001 2001 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 2001 0 
Brazil CTC REPORT 2002 2001 2001 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 2001 0 
Brazil CTC REPORT 2003 2001 2001 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 2001 0 
Brazil CTC REPORT 2004 2001 2001 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 2001 0 
Brazil CTC REPORT 2005 2001 2001 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 2001 0 
Brazil CTC REPORT 2006 2001 2001 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 2001 0 
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CTC REPORT 2002 2002 2002 2002 0 2002 0 2002 2002 2002 0 
Brunei 
Darussalam 
CTC REPORT 2003 2002 2002 2002 0 2002 0 2002 2002 2002 0 
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CTC REPORT 2005 2002 2002 2002 0 2002 0 2002 2002 2002 0 
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CTC REPORT 2007 2002 2002 2002 0 2002 0 2002 2002 2002 0 
Bulgaria CTC REPORT 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Bulgaria CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Bulgaria CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Bulgaria CTC REPORT 2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Bulgaria CTC REPORT 2005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Bulgaria LEGONL LAW 2010 2010 2010 2010 0 2010 0 0 2001 0 0 
Bulgaria LEGONL REPORT 2013 2010 2010 2010 0 2010 0 0 2001 0 0 
Bulgaria LEGONL LAW 2017 2010 2010 2010 0 2010 0 0 2001 0 0 
Burkina Faso CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Burkina Faso CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Burundi CTC REPORT 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Burundi CTC REPORT 2005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Cambodia CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Cambodia CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Cambodia CTC REPORT 2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
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Cameroon CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Cameroon CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Cameroon CTC REPORT 2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Canada CTC REPORT 2001 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 
Canada CTC REPORT 2002 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 
Canada CTC REPORT 2003 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 
Canada CTC REPORT 2004 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 
Canada CTC REPORT 2006 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 2006 0 
Canada LEGONL REPORT 2008 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 2006 0 
Cape Verde CTC REPORT 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Cape Verde CTC REPORT 2007 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Central African 
Republic 
CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Chad CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Chile CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Chile CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Chile CTC REPORT 2004 2004 0 2004 0 2004 0 0 2002 0 0 
Chile CTC REPORT 2006 2004 0 2004 0 2004 0 0 2002 0 0 
China CTC REPORT 2001 0 2001 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
China CTC REPORT 2002 0 2001 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
China CTC REPORT 2003 0 2001 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
China CTC REPORT 2004 0 2001 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
China CTC REPORT 2006 0 2001 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Colombia CTC REPORT 2001 0 2000 2000 2000 0 0 2000 2000 0 0 
Colombia CTC REPORT 2002 0 2000 2000 2000 0 0 2000 2000 0 0 
Colombia CTC REPORT 2003 0 2000 2000 2000 0 0 2000 2000 0 0 
Colombia CTC REPORT 2004 0 2000 2000 2000 0 0 2000 2000 0 0 
Colombia CTC REPORT 2006 0 2000 2000 2000 0 0 2000 2000 0 0 
Comoros CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Comoros CTC REPORT 2005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Costa Rica CTC REPORT 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Costa Rica CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Costa Rica CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Costa Rica CTC REPORT 2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Cote d'Ivoire CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cote d'Ivoire CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Croatia CTC REPORT 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Croatia CTC REPORT 2002 2001 0 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Croatia CTC REPORT 2003 2001 0 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Croatia LEGONL LAW 2003 2001 0 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Croatia CTC REPORT 2004 2001 2004 2001 0 2004 0 0 2004 0 0 
Croatia LEGONL REPORT 2011 2001 2004 2001 2008 2004 0 0 2004 0 0 
Cuba CTC REPORT 2002 2001 2001 2001 0 0 0 2001 2001 0 2001 
Cuba CTC REPORT 2003 2001 2001 2001 0 0 0 2001 2001 0 2001 
Cuba CTC REPORT 2004 2001 2001 2001 0 0 0 2001 2001 0 2001 
Cuba CTC REPORT 2006 2001 2001 2001 0 0 0 2001 2001 0 2001 
Cyprus CTC REPORT 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Cyprus CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Cyprus CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Cyprus CTC REPORT 2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Cyprus CTC REPORT 2005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Cyprus CTC REPORT 2006 2006 2006 2006 0 2006 0 2006 2001 2006 0 
Cyprus LEGONL REPORT 2011 2006 2006 2006 0 2006 0 2006 2001 2006 0 
Czech Republic CTC REPORT 2001 2001 0 0 0 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 
Czech Republic CTC REPORT 2002 2001 0 0 0 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 
Czech Republic CTC REPORT 2003 2001 0 0 0 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 
Czech Republic CTC REPORT 2004 2001 0 0 0 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 
Czech Republic CTC REPORT 2005 2001 2004 2004 0 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 
Czech Republic CTC REPORT 2006 2001 2004 2004 0 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 
Czech Republic LEGONL REPORT 2012 2001 2004 2004 0 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 














CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Democratic 
Republic of the 
Congo 
CTC REPORT 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Democratic 
Republic of the 
Congo 
CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Democratic 
Republic of the 
Congo 
CTC REPORT 2005 2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Democratic 
Republic of the 
Congo 
CTC REPORT 2008 2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Denmark CTC REPORT 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Denmark CTC REPORT 2002 2002 2002 2002 0 2002 0 0 2001 0 0 
Denmark CTC REPORT 2003 2002 2002 2002 0 2002 0 0 2001 0 0 
Denmark CTC REPORT 2004 2002 2002 2002 0 2002 0 0 2001 0 0 
Denmark CTC REPORT 2005 2002 2002 2002 0 2002 0 0 2001 0 0 
Denmark LEGONL REPORT 2007 2002 2002 2002 0 2002 0 0 2001 0 0 
Djibouti CTC REPORT 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Djibouti CTC REPORT 2003 2001 0 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Djibouti CTC REPORT 2004 2001 0 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Djibouti CTC REPORT 2005 2001 0 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Djibouti CTC REPORT 2006 2001 0 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Dominica CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Dominican 
Republic 
CTC REPORT 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Dominican 
Republic 
CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Dominican 
Republic 
CTC REPORT 2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Ecuador CTC REPORT 2001 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 2001 0 
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Ecuador CTC REPORT 2002 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 2001 0 
Ecuador CTC REPORT 2003 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 2001 0 
Ecuador CTC REPORT 2004 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 2001 0 
Egypt CTC REPORT 2001 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 2001 2001 2001 0 0 
Egypt CTC REPORT 2002 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 2001 2001 2001 0 0 
Egypt CTC REPORT 2003 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 2001 2001 2001 0 0 
Egypt CTC REPORT 2004 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 2001 2001 2001 0 0 
Egypt CTC REPORT 2005 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 2001 2001 2001 0 0 
Egypt CTC REPORT 2006 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 2001 2001 2001 0 0 
El Salvador CTC REPORT 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
El Salvador CTC REPORT 2002 2001 0 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
El Salvador CTC REPORT 2003 2001 0 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
El Salvador CTC REPORT 2004 2001 0 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
El Salvador CTC REPORT 2005 2001 0 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
El Salvador CTC REPORT 2006 2001 0 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Equitorial Guinea CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2003 0 0 
Eritrea CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Eritrea CTC REPORT 2007 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Estonia CTC REPORT 2001 2001 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 2001 2001 0 
Estonia CTC REPORT 2002 2001 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 2001 2001 0 
Estonia CTC REPORT 2003 2001 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 2001 2001 0 
Estonia CTC REPORT 2004 2001 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 2001 2001 0 
Estonia CTC REPORT 2005 2001 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 2001 2001 0 
Estonia CTC REPORT 2006 2001 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 2001 2001 0 
Ethiopia CTC REPORT 2002 2002 2002 2002 0 2002 0 0 2002 0 0 
Ethiopia CTC REPORT 2006 2002 2002 2002 0 2002 0 0 2002 0 0 
Fiji CTC REPORT 2002 2002 2002 0 0 2002 0 0 2002 2002 0 
Fiji CTC REPORT 2003 2002 2002 0 0 2002 0 0 2002 2002 0 
Finland CTC REPORT 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Finland CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Finland CTC REPORT 2003 2003 2003 2003 0 2003 0 0 2001 0 0 
Finland CTC REPORT 2004 2003 2003 2003 0 2003 0 0 2001 0 0 
Finland CTC REPORT 2005 2003 2003 2003 0 2003 0 0 2001 0 0 
Finland LEGONL REPORT 2014 2003 2003 2003 0 2003 0 0 2001 0 0 
Finland LEGONL LAW 2015 2003 2003 2003 0 2003 0 0 2001 0 0 
Finland LEGONL LAW 2015 2003 2003 2003 0 2003 0 0 2001 0 0 
France CTC REPORT 2001 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 
France CTC REPORT 2002 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 
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France CTC REPORT 2003 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 
France CTC REPORT 2004 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 
France LEGONL REPORT 2013 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 
Gabon CTC REPORT 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Gabon CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Gabon CTC REPORT 2007 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Gambia CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Georgia CTC REPORT 2002 2002 2002 2002 0 2002 0 0 2002 0 0 
Georgia LEGONL REPORT 2006 2002 2002 2002 0 2002 0 0 2002 0 0 
Georgia LEGONL LAW 2007 2002 2002 2002 0 2002 0 2007 2002 0 0 
Georgia LEGONL LAW 2011 2002 2002 2002 0 2002 0 0 2002 2011 0 
Germany CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Germany CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Germany CTC REPORT 2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Germany LEGONL LAW 2009 2009 2009 2009 0 2009 0 0 2002 0 2009 
Germany LEGONL REPORT 2009 2009 2009 2009 0 2009 0 0 2002 0 2009 
Ghana CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Ghana CTC REPORT 2005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Greece CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Greece CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Greece CTC REPORT 2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Greece CTC REPORT 2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Greece LEGONL REPORT 2012 2012 2012 2012 0 2012 0 0 2002 0 0 
Grenada CTC REPORT 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Grenada CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Guatemala CTC REPORT 2001           
Guatemala CTC REPORT 2002 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Guatemala CTC REPORT 2003 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Guatemala CTC REPORT 2004 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Guatemala CTC REPORT 2005 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Guinea CTC REPORT 2002 2002 0 2002 0 2002 0 0 2002 0 0 
Guinea CTC REPORT 2003 2002 0 2002 0 2002 0 0 2002 0 0 
Guinea-Bissau CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2003 0 0 
Guyana CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Guyana CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Haiti CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Haiti CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Honduras CTC REPORT 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
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Honduras CTC REPORT 2005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Hungary CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Hungary CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Hungary CTC REPORT 2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Hungary CTC REPORT 2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Hungary LEGONL REPORT 2012 2012 2012 2012 0 2012 0 0 2001 0 0 
Iceland CTC REPORT 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Iceland CTC REPORT 2002 2002 2002 2002 0 2002 0 0 2001 0 0 
Iceland CTC REPORT 2003 2002 2002 2002 0 2002 0 0 2001 0 0 
Iceland CTC REPORT 2004 2002 2002 2002 0 2002 0 0 2001 0 0 
Iceland LEGONL REPORT 2006 2002 2002 2002 0 2002 0 0 2001 0 0 
India SATP LAW 2001 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 
India CTC REPORT 2001 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 
India CTC REPORT 2002 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 
India CTC REPORT 2003 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 
India CTC REPORT 2004 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 
India CTC REPORT 2007 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 
Indonesia CTC REPORT 2001 2001 2001 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Indonesia CTC REPORT 2002 2001 2001 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Indonesia CTC REPORT 2003 2001 2001 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Indonesia CTC REPORT 2004 2001 2001 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Indonesia CTC REPORT 2006 2001 2001 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Iran CTC REPORT 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Iran CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Iran CTC REPORT 2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Iran CTC REPORT 2005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Iran CTC REPORT 2007 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Iraq CTC REPORT 2001           
Iraq CTC REPORT 2002 2002 2002 0 0 2002 0 2002 2002 0 0 
Iraq CTC REPORT 2006 2002 2002 2005 2005 2002 2005 2002 2002 0 0 
Ireland CTC REPORT 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Ireland CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Ireland CTC REPORT 2003 2002 0 2002 2002 2002 0 0 2001 0 0 
Ireland CTC REPORT 2004 2002 0 2002 2002 2002 0 0 2001 0 0 
Ireland LEGONL REPORT 2007 2002 2005 2002 2002 2002 0 0 2001 0 0 
Ireland LEGONL LAW 2015 2002 2005 2002 2002 2002 0 2015 2001 0 0 
Israel CTC REPORT 2001 2001 0 0 0 0 0 2001 2001 0 0 
Israel CTC REPORT 2002 2001 0 0 0 0 0 2001 2001 0 0 
Israel CTC REPORT 2003 2001 0 0 0 0 0 2001 2001 0 0 
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Israel CTC REPORT 2004 2001 0 0 0 0 0 2001 2001 0 0 
Israel CTC REPORT 2006 2001 0 2005 0 0 0 2001 2001 0 0 
Italy CTC REPORT 2002 2001 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 
Italy CTC REPORT 2003 2001 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 
Italy CTC REPORT 2004 2001 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 
Italy LEGONL REPORT 2008 2001 2001 2005 0 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 
Jamaica CTC REPORT 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Jamaica CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Jamaica CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Jamaica CTC REPORT 2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Jamaica CTC REPORT 2005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Japan CTC REPORT 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Japan CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Japan CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Japan CTC REPORT 2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Japan CTC REPORT 2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Jordan CTC REPORT 2002 2001 2001 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Jordan CTC REPORT 2003 2001 2001 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Jordan CTC REPORT 2005 2001 2001 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Jordan CTC REPORT 2006 2001 2001 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Kazakhstan CTC REPORT 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Kazakhstan CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Kazakhstan CTC REPORT 2003 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 2001 2001 0 0 
Kazakhstan CTC REPORT 2004 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 2001 2001 0 0 
Kazakhstan LEGONL LAW 2004 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 2001 2001 2004 0 
Kazakhstan CTC REPORT 2005 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 2001 2001 0 0 
Kenya CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Kenya CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Kenya CTC REPORT 2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Kirbati CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Kuwait CTC REPORT 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Kuwait CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Kuwait CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Kuwait CTC REPORT 2004 0 0 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Kuwait CTC REPORT 2006 0 0 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Kyrgystan CTC REPORT 2002 2002 2002 2002 0 2002 0 2002 2002 2002 0 
Kyrgystan CTC REPORT 2003 2002 2002 2002 0 2002 0 2002 2002 2002 0 
Kyrgystan CTC REPORT 2004 2002 2002 2002 0 2002 0 2002 2002 2002 0 
Kyrgystan CTC REPORT 2006 2002 2002 2002 0 2002 0 2002 2002 2002 0 
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Kyrgystan LEGONL LAW 2006 2002 2002 2002 0 2002 0 2002 2002 2002 0 
Laos CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Laos CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Latvia CTC REPORT 2002 2002 2002 0 0 2002  0 2002 0 0 
Latvia CTC REPORT 2003 2002 2002 0 0 2002  0 2002 0 0 
Latvia CTC REPORT 2004 2002 2002 0 0 2002  0 2002 0 0 
Latvia CTC REPORT 2005 2002 2002 0 0 2002  0 2002 0 0 
Latvia CTC REPORT 2006 2002 2002 0 0 2002  0 2002 0 0 
Latvia LEGONL REPORT 2013 2002 2002 2013 0 2002  0 2002 0 0 
Lebanon CTC REPORT 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Lebanon CTC REPORT 2002 2002 0 2002 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Lebanon CTC REPORT 2003 2002 0 2002 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Lebanon CTC REPORT 2004 2002 0 2002 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Lebanon CTC REPORT 2006 2002 0 2002 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Lesotho CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Lesotho CTC REPORT 2004 2004 0 2004 0 2004 0 0 2002 0 0 
Liberia CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2003 0 0 
Libya CTC REPORT 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Libya CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Libya CTC REPORT 2003 2003 2003 2003 0 2003 0 2003 2001 0 0 
Libya CTC REPORT 2005 2003 2003 2003 0 2003 0 2003 2001 0 0 
Libya CTC REPORT 2006 2003 2003 2003 0 2003 0 2003 2001 0 0 
Liechtenstein CTC REPORT 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Liechtenstein CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Liechtenstein CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Liechtenstein CTC REPORT 2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Liechtenstein CTC REPORT 2006 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Liechtenstein LEGONL REPORT 2012 2003 2009 2009 0 2009 0 0 2001 0 0 
Lithuania CTC REPORT 2002 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Lithuania CTC REPORT 2003 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Lithuania CTC REPORT 2004 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Lithuania LEGONL REPORT 2005 2002 2003 2003 0 2003 0 2004 2002 0 0 
Lithuania CTC REPORT 2006 2002 2003 2003 0 2003 0 2004 2002 0 0 
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Luxemborg CTC REPORT 2002 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Luxemborg CTC REPORT 2003 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Luxemborg CTC REPORT 2004 2002 0 2004 0 2004 0 0 2002 0 0 
Luxemborg LEGONL REPORT 2005 2002 0 2004 0 2004 0 0 2002 0 0 
Luxemborg CTC REPORT 2006 2002 0 2004 0 2004 0 0 2002 0 0 
Macedonia CTC REPORT 2001 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 
Macedonia CTC REPORT 2002 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 
Macedonia CTC REPORT 2003 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 2004 2001 0 0 
Macedonia CTC REPORT 2005 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 2004 2001 0 0 
Macedonia LEGONL LAW 2006 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 2004 2001 0 0 
Macedonia LEGONL REPORT 2010 2001 2001 2001 2008 2001 0 2004 2001 0 0 
Madagascar CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Madagascar CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Malawi CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Malawi CTC REPORT 2005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Malaysia CTC REPORT 2002 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Malaysia CTC REPORT 2003 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Malaysia CTC REPORT 2004 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Malaysia CTC REPORT 2005 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Maldives SATP LAW 1990 2001 2001 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 2001 0 
Maldives CTC REPORT 2002 2001 2001 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 2001 0 
Maldives CTC REPORT 2004 2001 2001 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 2001 0 
Mali CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Mali CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Mali CTC REPORT 2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Malta CTC REPORT 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Malta CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Malta CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Malta CTC REPORT 2005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Malta LEGONL LAW 2013 2013 2013 2013 0 2013 0 2013 2002 0 0 
Marshall Islands CTC REPORT 2003 0 2002 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Marshall Islands CTC REPORT 2004 0 2002 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Mauritania CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Mauritania CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Mauritius CTC REPORT 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
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Mauritius CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Mauritius CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Mauritius CTC REPORT 2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Mauritius CTC REPORT 2005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Mauritius CTC REPORT 2006 2002 2002 2002 0 2002 0 0 2001 0 0 
Mexico CTC REPORT 2001 2001 0 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 
Mexico CTC REPORT 2002 2001 0 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 
Mexico CTC REPORT 2003 2001 0 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 
Mexico CTC REPORT 2004 2001 0 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 
Mexico CTC REPORT 2006 2001 0 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 
Micronesia CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Monaco CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Monaco CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Monaco CTC REPORT 2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Monaco CTC REPORT 2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Mongolia CTC REPORT 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Mongolia CTC REPORT 2002 2002 2002 2002 0 2002 0 0 2001 0 0 
Mongolia CTC REPORT 2005 2002 2002 2002 0 2002 0 0 2001 0 0 
Montenegro CTC REPORT 2008 2008 2008 2008 0 2008 0 0 2008 0 0 
Montenegro LEGONL LAW 2013 2008 2008 2008 0 2008 0 0 2008 0 0 
Montenegro LEGONL REPORT 2013 2008 2008 2008 0 2008 0 0 2008 0 0 
Morocco CTC REPORT 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Morocco CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Morocco CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Morocco CTC REPORT 2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Mozambique CTC REPORT 2001 2001 0 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 
Mozambique CTC REPORT 2003 2001 0 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 
Mozambique CTC REPORT 2005 2001 0 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 
Myanmar CTC REPORT 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Myanmar CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Myanmar CTC REPORT 2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Myanmar CTC REPORT 2005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Myanmar CTC REPORT 2006 2006 0 0 2006 0 0 0 2001 2006 0 
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Namibia CTC REPORT 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Namibia CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Namibia CTC REPORT 2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Namibia CTC REPORT 2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Nauru CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Nauru CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Nauru CTC REPORT 2005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Nepal SATP LAW 2001 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 2001 2001 0 2001 
Nepal CTC REPORT 2001 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 2001 2001 0 2001 
Nepal CTC REPORT 2003 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 2001 2001 0 2001 
Nepal CTC REPORT 2005 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 2001 2001 0 2001 
Netherlands CTC REPORT 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Netherlands CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Netherlands CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Netherlands LEGONL LAW 2004 2004 2004 2004 0 2004 0 0 2001 0 0 
Netherlands CTC REPORT 2005 2004 2004 2004 0 2004 0 0 2001 0 0 
Netherlands LEGONL REPORT 2008 2004 2004 2004 0 2004 0 0 2001 0 0 
New Zealand CTC REPORT 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
New Zealand CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
New Zealand CTC REPORT 2003 2003 2003 2003 0 0 0 2003 2001 0 0 
New Zealand CTC REPORT 2004 2003 2003 2003 0 0 0 2003 2001 0 0 
New Zealand CTC REPORT 2006 2003 2003 2003 0 0 0 2003 2001 0 0 
Nicaragua CTC REPORT 2002 2001 2001 2001 0 0 0 2001 2001 0 0 
Nicaragua CTC REPORT 2003 2001 2001 2001 0 0 0 2001 2001 0 0 
Nicaragua CTC REPORT 2004 2001 2001 2001 0 0 0 2001 2001 0 0 
Niger CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Niger CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Niger CTC REPORT 2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
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Niger CTC REPORT 2008 2003 2003 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Nigeria CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Nigeria CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Nigeria CTC REPORT 2007 2007 2007 2007 0 2007 0 2007 2002 0 0 
Norway CTC REPORT 2001 2001 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 2001 0 0 
Norway CTC REPORT 2002 2001 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 2001 0 0 
Norway CTC REPORT 2003 2001 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 2001 0 0 
Norway CTC REPORT 2004 2001 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 2001 0 0 
Norway CTC REPORT 2006 2001 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 2001 0 0 
Norway LEGONL REPORT 2008 2001 2001 2008 0 2008 0 2001 2001 0 0 
Oman CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Oman CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Oman CTC REPORT 2005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Pakistan SATP LAW 1997 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 2001 2001 0 0 
Pakistan CTC REPORT 2001 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 2001 2001 0 0 
Pakistan CTC REPORT 2002 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 2001 2001 0 0 
Pakistan CTC REPORT 2003 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 2001 2001 0 0 
Pakistan CTC REPORT 2004 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 2001 2001 0 0 
Pakistan CTC REPORT 2005 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 2001 2001 0 0 
Palau CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Palau CTC REPORT 2005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Panama CTC REPORT 2002 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 2002 0 
Panama CTC REPORT 2003 2002 0 2003 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Panama CTC REPORT 2004 2002 0 2003 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Panama CTC REPORT 2006 2002 0 2003 0 2003 0 2003 2002 0 0 
Papua New 
Guinea 
CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Papua New 
Guinea 
CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2003 0 0 
Paraguay CTC REPORT 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Paraguay CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Paraguay CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Paraguay CTC REPORT 2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Paraguay CTC REPORT 2005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Peru CTC REPORT 2002 2002 2002 2002 0 2002 0 0 2002 2002 0 
Peru CTC REPORT 2003 2002 2002 2002 0 2002 0 0 2002 2002 0 
Peru CTC REPORT 2004 2002 2002 2002 0 2002 0 0 2002 2002 0 
Philippines CTC REPORT 2001 0 2001 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Philippines CTC REPORT 2002 0 2001 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
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Philippines CTC REPORT 2003 0 2001 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Philippines CTC REPORT 2005 2004 2001 2004 0 2004 0 0 2004 2004 0 
Poland CTC REPORT 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Poland CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Poland CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Poland CTC REPORT 2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Poland CTC REPORT 2006 2004 2004 2004 0 2004 0 0 2001 0 0 
Poland LEGONL REPORT 2012 2004 2004 2004 0 2004 0 0 2001 0 0 
Poland LEGONL LAW 2016 2004 2004 2004 0 2004 0 0 2001 0 0 
Portugal CTC REPORT 2002 2002 2002 2002 0 2002 0 2002 2002 0 0 
Portugal CTC REPORT 2003 2002 2002 2002 0 2002 0 2002 2002 0 0 
Portugal CTC REPORT 2005 2002 2002 2002 0 2002 0 2002 2002 0 0 
Portugal LEGONL REPORT 2006 2002 2002 2002 0 2002 0 2002 2002 0 0 
Qatar CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Qatar CTC REPORT 2004 2004 2004 2004 0 2004 0 0 2002 0 0 
Qatar CTC REPORT 2006 2004 2004 2004 0 2004 0 0 2002 0 0 
Republic of 
Korea 
CTC REPORT 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Republic of 
Korea 
CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Republic of 
Korea 
CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Republic of 
Korea 
CTC REPORT 2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Republic of 
Korea 
CTC REPORT 2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Republic of 
Moldova 
CTC REPORT 2002 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 2002 0 
Republic of 
Moldova 
CTC REPORT 2003 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 2002 0 
Republic of 
Moldova 
CTC REPORT 2006 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 2002 0 
Republic of 
Moldova 
LEGONL LAW 2009 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 2002 0 
Republic of 
Moldova 
LEGONL REPORT 2009 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 2002 0 
Republic of the 
Congo 
CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
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Republic of the 
Congo 
CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Republic of the 
Congo 
CTC REPORT 2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Republic of the 
Congo 
CTC REPORT 2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Romania CTC REPORT 2001 2001 2001 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Romania CTC REPORT 2002 2001 2001 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Romania CTC REPORT 2003 2001 2001 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Romania CTC REPORT 2005 2001 2001 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Romania CTC REPORT 2006 2001 2001 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Romania LEGONL REPORT 2008 2001 2001 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Russia CTC REPORT 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Russia CTC REPORT 2002 2002 2002 2002 0 2002 0 0 2001 0 0 
Russia CTC REPORT 2003 2002 2002 2002 0 2002 0 0 2001 0 0 
Russia LEGONL LAW 2006 2002 2002 2002 0 2002 0 0 2001 0 0 
Russia CTC REPORT 2006 2002 2002 2002 0 2002 0 0 2001 0 0 
Russia LEGONL REPORT 2008 2002 2002 2002 0 2002 0 0 2001 0 0 
Rwanda CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 2001 0 0 
Rwanda CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 2001 0 0 
Rwanda CTC REPORT 2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 2001 0 0 
Rwanda CTC REPORT 2005 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 2001 0 0 
Saint Kitts and 
Nevis 
CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Saint Lucia CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Saint Vincent and 
Grenadines 
CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Saint Vincent and 
Grenadines 
CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Samoa CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Samoa CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Samoa CTC REPORT 2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
San Marino CTC REPORT 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
San Marino CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
San Marino CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
San Marino CTC REPORT 2004 2004 0 2004 0 2004 0 0 2001 0 0 
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Sao Tome and 
Principe 
CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2003 0 0 
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
CTC REPORT 2005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2003 0 0 
Saudi Arabia CTC REPORT 2001 0 0 2001 2001 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Saudi Arabia CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 2001 2001 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Saudi Arabia CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 2001 2001 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Saudi Arabia CTC REPORT 2004 0 0 2001 2001 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Senegal CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Senegal CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Serbia CTC REPORT 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Serbia CTC REPORT 2002 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 2001 0 
Serbia CTC REPORT 2004 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 2001 0 
Serbia CTC REPORT 2006 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 2001 0 
Serbia LEGONL REPORT 2012 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 2001 0 
Seychelles CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2003 0 0 
Seychelles CTC REPORT 2005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2003 0 0 
Seychelles CTC REPORT 2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2003 0 0 
Sierra Leone CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2003 0 0 
Singapore CTC REPORT 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Singapore CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Singapore CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Singapore CTC REPORT 2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Singapore CTC REPORT 2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Slovakia CTC REPORT 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Slovakia CTC REPORT 2002 2002 2002 2002 0 2002 0 0 2002 0 0 
Slovakia CTC REPORT 2004 2002 2002 2002 0 2002 0 0 2002 0 0 
Slovakia CTC REPORT 2005 2002 2002 2002 0 2002 0 0 2002 0 0 
Slovakia CTC REPORT 2006 2002 2002 2002 0 2002 0 0 2002 0 0 
Slovakia LEGONL REPORT 2007 2002 2002 2002 0 2002 0 0 2002 0 0 
Slovenia CTC REPORT 2001 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 
Slovenia CTC REPORT 2002 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 
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Slovenia CTC REPORT 2003 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 
Slovenia CTC REPORT 2005 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 
Slovenia LEGONL REPORT 2009 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 
Solomon Islands CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Somalia CTC REPORT 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
South Africa CTC REPORT 2001 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 2001 0 
South Africa CTC REPORT 2002 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 2001 0 
South Africa CTC REPORT 2003 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 2001 0 
South Africa CTC REPORT 2004 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 2001 2001 2001 0 
South Africa CTC REPORT 2006 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 2001 0 
Spain CTC REPORT 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Spain CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Spain CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Spain CTC REPORT 2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Spain LEGONL REPORT 2013 2010 2010 2010 0 2010 0 0 2001 0 0 
Sri Lanka SATP LAW 1979 2001 2001 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Sri Lanka CTC REPORT 2001 2001 2001 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Sri Lanka CTC REPORT 2002 2001 2001 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Sri Lanka CTC REPORT 2003 2001 2001 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Sri Lanka CTC REPORT 2005 2001 2001 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Sudan CTC REPORT 2001 2001 2001 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 2001 0 
Sudan CTC REPORT 2002 2001 2001 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 2001 0 
Sudan CTC REPORT 2003 2001 2001 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 2001 0 
Sudan CTC REPORT 2004 2001 2001 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 2001 0 
Sudan CTC REPORT 2006 2001 2001 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 2001 0 
Suriname CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Suriname CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Swaziland CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 2003 0 2003 2003 0 0 
Sweden CTC REPORT 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Sweden CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Sweden LEGONL LAW 2003 2003 2003 2003 0 2003 0 0 2001 0 0 
Sweden CTC REPORT 2004 2003 2003 2003 0 2003 0 0 2001 0 0 
Sweden CTC REPORT 2005 2003 2003 2003 0 2003 0 0 2001 0 0 
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Sweden LEGONL REPORT 2013 2003 2003 2003 0 2003 0 0 2001 0 0 
Switzerland CTC REPORT 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Switzerland CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Switzerland CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Switzerland CTC REPORT 2005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Switzerland LEGONL REPORT 2014 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Syria CTC REPORT 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Syria CTC REPORT 2002 2001 0 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Syria CTC REPORT 2003 2001 0 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Syria CTC REPORT 2005 2001 0 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Syria CTC REPORT 2006 2001 0 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Tajikistan LEGONL REPORT 1999 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 2001 0 
Tajikistan CTC REPORT 2002 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 2001 0 
Tajikistan CTC REPORT 2003 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 2001 0 
Tajikistan CTC REPORT 2004 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 2001 0 
Tajikistan CTC REPORT 2006 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 
Tanzania CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Tanzania CTC REPORT 2005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Thailand CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Thailand CTC REPORT 2003 2003 2003 2003 0 2003 0 2003 2002 0 0 
Thailand CTC REPORT 2004 2003 2003 2003 0 2003 0 2003 2002 0 0 
Timor-leste CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2003 0 0 
Timor-leste CTC REPORT 2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2003 0 0 
Togo CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Tonga CTC REPORT 2002 2002 2002 2002 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Tonga CTC REPORT 2003 2002 2002 2002 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Tonga CTC REPORT 2006 2002 2002 2002 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
CTC REPORT 2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Tunisia CTC REPORT 2001 2001 2001 2001 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Tunisia CTC REPORT 2002 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 
Tunisia CTC REPORT 2003 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 2003 2001 0 0 
Tunisia CTC REPORT 2005 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 2003 2001 0 0 
Turkey CTC REPORT 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Turkey CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Turkey CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Turkey CTC REPORT 2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
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Turkey CTC REPORT 2006 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 
Turkey LEGONL LAW 2010 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 2010 0 
Turkey LEGONL REPORT 2013 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 2010 0 
Turkmenistan CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Turkmenistan LEGONL LAW 2003 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 2003 0 2001 0 0 
Turkmenistan CTC REPORT 2003 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 2003 0 2001 0 0 
Turkmenistan CTC REPORT 2005 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 2003 0 2001 2005 0 
Turkmenistan CTC REPORT 2009 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 2003 0 2001 2005 0 
Tuvalu CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2003 0 0 
Tuvalu CTC REPORT 2007 0 2007 0 0 0 0 0 2003 0 0 
Uganda CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Uganda CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Uganda CTC REPORT 2005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Ukraine CTC REPORT 2001 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 2001 0 
Ukraine CTC REPORT 2002 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 2001 0 
Ukraine LEGONL LAW 2003 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 2003 2001 2001 0 
Ukraine CTC REPORT 2003 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 2003 2001 2001 0 
Ukraine CTC REPORT 2004 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 2003 2001 2001 0 
Ukraine CTC REPORT 2006 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 2003 2001 2001 0 
Ukraine LEGONL REPORT 2011 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 2003 2001 2001 0 
United Arab 
Emirates 
CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
United Arab 
Emirates 
CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
United Arab 
Emirates 
CTC REPORT 2005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
United Kingdom LEGONL LAW 2000 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 2001 0 
United Kingdom CTC REPORT 2001 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 2001 0 
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United Kingdom CTC REPORT 2002 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 2001 0 
United Kingdom CTC REPORT 2003 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 2001 0 
United Kingdom CTC REPORT 2004 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 2001 0 
United Kingdom CTC REPORT 2005 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 2001 0 
United Kingdom LEGONL REPORT 2007 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 2001 0 
United States LEGONL LAW 2001 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 
United States CTC REPORT 2001 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 2001 2001 0 0 
United States CTC REPORT 2002 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 2001 2001 0 0 
United States LEGONL LAW 2003 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 2001 2001 2003 0 
United States CTC REPORT 2004 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 2001 2001 2003 0 
United States CTC REPORT 2006 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 2001 2001 2003 0 
Uruguay CTC REPORT 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Uruguay CTC REPORT 2002 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Uruguay CTC REPORT 2004 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Uruguay CTC REPORT 2005 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Uzbekistan LEGONL LAW 2000 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 2001 0 
Uzbekistan CTC REPORT 2002 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 2001 0 
Uzbekistan CTC REPORT 2003 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 2001 0 
Uzbekistan CTC REPORT 2005 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 2001 0 
Uzbekistan CTC REPORT 2006 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 2001 2006 
Vanautu CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2003 0 0 
Vanautu CTC REPORT 2007 0 2006 0 0 0 0 0 2003 0 0 
Venezuela CTC REPORT 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Venezuela CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Venezuela CTC REPORT 2003 2003 2001 2003 0 2003 0 2003 2001 2003 0 
Venezuela CTC REPORT 2004 2003 2001 2003 0 2003 0 2003 2001 2003 0 
Vietnam CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 
Vietnam CTC REPORT 2003 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 
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Vietnam CTC REPORT 2004 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 
Vietnam CTC REPORT 2006 2001 2001 2001 0 2001 0 0 2001 0 0 
Yemen CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Yemen CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Yemen CTC REPORT 2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Yemen CTC REPORT 2006 2006 2006 2006 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Zambia CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Zimbabwe CTC REPORT 2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
Zimbabwe CTC REPORT 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 
 
 
